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INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 2007 Theresa Hernandez was sentenced in
Oklahoma City to fifteen years in prison for second-degree murder,
based on her delivery of a stillborn child and her admission that she
[Vol. 15:389
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took methamphetamine while pregnant.' There is no reliable evidence
linking stillbirths to methamphetamine use,2 but Hernandez is only the
latest of scores of American women targeted in a national crusade
against "fetal abuse," who have been prosecuted, and sentenced to
lengthy prison terms based on their use of legal and illegal drugs while
pregnant. This crusade began in the late 1980s, with the prosecution of
women who used cocaine while pregnant for crimes like child endan-
germent and delivery of drug to a minor. In the last several years this
crusade has become a veritable holy war, accelerating in intensity and
scope. Since 1999, more than thirty American women have been in-
dicted for using alcohol or other drugs while pregnant-charged with
crimes ranging from child abuse to first-degree murder-and have re-
ceived prison sentences of up to twenty years.
The American "fetal protection" movement is unique among devel-
oped and developing nations. While other nations also have children
who are born "at risk" and populations of poor pregnant women whose
lives are highly dysfunctional or who are addicted to alcohol and other
drugs, only in the United States are these women criminally prosecuted
or civilly committed based on their conduct while pregnant.' Only in
1. Ms. Hernandez was initially charged with first degree murder and faced a life sen-
tence. After having being held in county jail awaiting trial for three years without
being able to have her children visit her, she entered a guilty plea to second-degree
murder. Dana Stone, Letter to the Editor, Is Meth Murder Charge Useful?, OKaLAHO-
MAN (Okla. City), Dec, 19, 2007; see also Jay F. Marks, For Meth Mom, A Tough
RoadAhead, DAILY OK AHOMAN (Okla. City), Dec. 22, 2007.
2. Stone, supra note 1 (citing statement by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists that there is no evidence linking methamphetamine use with still-
births). See also Kathryn Wells, Methamphetamine and Pregnancy,
http://www.mappsd.org/Meth%20&%2OPregnancy.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009)
(" [N]o true syndrome specifically linked with maternal use of Methamphetamine use
in the prenatal period has been described").
3. The first reported effort at prosecution was in 1989 in Winnebago County, Illinois,
for involuntary manslaughter, but the grand jury refused to indict. Marcella S. Kre-
iter, Cocaine Mothers and Cocaine Babies, UNITED PRESS INT'L, May 27, 1989, BC
cycle. Since then, at least thirty states have charged women with murder, manslaugh-
ter, child abuse or endangerment, or drug delivery to a minor. Lynn M. Paltrow,
Punishing Pregnant Women for Their Behavior During Pregnancy: An Approach that
Undermines the Health of Women and Children, in DRUG ADDICTION RESEARCH AND
THE HEATH OF WOMEN 467, 468 (Cora Lee Wetherington & Adele B. Roman eds.,
1998), available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/PDF/DARHW/467-502-Paltrow.pdf.
See Appendix A for a list of prosecutions.
4. As the detailed comparative law analysis presented infra will show, there have been no
efforts to criminally prosecute or civilly commit pregnant women who use alcohol or
other drugs in France. In Canada, where there were two reported cases of criminal
prosecution or civil commitment in the 1990s, the Canadian courts have taken a firm
2009]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
the United States do prosecutors take the position that embryos and
fetuses should be protected as full human beings while in utero.5 At the
same time, the United States stands alone among developed countries in
failing to guarantee access to health care to women and children
throughout their lives and in failing to provide other economic, legal,
and social supports (including treatment for drug and alcohol addiction)
in order to increase the chances that women can nurture and provide for
their children, as well as reduce the incidence of women's addiction. Al-
most all the women targeted by American "fetal protection" warriors
exist at the very margins of society. In addition to their to alcohol or
drug addiction, the overwhelming majority of these women have histo-
ries of mental illness and/or mental retardation; there is significant
evidence that much of their drug use is an attempt to self-medicate for
depression or other illnesses.6 The targeted women are overwhelmingly
women of color, and they are almost always poor.7 In many cases, they
are victims of childhood sexual abuse and current domestic violence.8
In this Article I will examine not only the substantive legal differ-
ences between the United States, Canada, and France, but I will also
explore how these legal rules fit within a broader social, political, and
religious setting. I will pursue four lines of inquiry. First, I will briefly
chronicle the history of criminal prosecution of pregnant women in
America and show how these prosecutions have become markedly more
aggressive over the last twenty years. Second, I will situate these prosecu-
tions in the full context of American law and culture, demonstrating
stance against such legal actions, and none have been instituted for more than ten
years. (My research has disclosed no reported cases since 1997.)
5. See discussion infra Part I.
6. See WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF PREGNANT AND PAR-
ENTING WOMEN WITH SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS IN PHILADELPHIA 4, 6 (2002),
available at http://www.womenslawproject.org/reports/Pregnant parentingPVS.pdf;
see also Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnancy, Domestic Violence, and the Law: The Interface of
Medicine, Public Health, and the Law: Governmental Responses to Pregnant Women
Who UseAlcoholor Other Drugs, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 461,477 (2005).
7. LAURA GOMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE
POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 118 (1997); Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshack-
ling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REv. 938, 939 (1997).
8. GOMEZ, supra note 7, at 17; see also WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 6; Paltrow,
supra note 3, at 468-69. It is notable that domestic violence rises in connection with
pregnancy. Homicide accounts for more than 11% of all deaths of pregnant women.
Antonia Zerbisias, Killings Reopen Debate on Rights of Fetuses, TORONTO STAR, Oct.
10, 2007, at LI, available at LEXIS. Homicide is the second most common cause of
death for pregnant women, following only behind auto accidents, but ahead of the
death rate for any single pregnancy-related condition. Id.; Lynn Moriarty, Op-Ed.,
Valley Voice: Pregnant Women Face Increased Violence, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs,
Cal.), June 28, 2007, at 6B, available at LEXIS.
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how the fetus has received increasing legal recognition in a wide variety
of circumstances. I will argue here that "fetal protection" prosecutions
are part of a broader attack on women's rights, including the right to
reproductive freedom as well as the right to control their economic and
private lives generally. I will examine how American law's focus on the
fetus as the sole "person" at risk, rather than on the maternal-fetal dyad,
skews the legal and political arguments that take place. I will contrast
the emphasis on the fetus with the failure of American government to
provide adequate health care for women and children. Third, I will ex-
amine the laws of two other nations, Canada and France, for purposes
of comparative legal, cultural, and economic analysis,9 and will offer
9. I have chosen Canada and France for comparative law purposes for several reasons.
Both are developed democracies, with capitalist economic systems and standards of
living comparable to the United States. Canada shares the United States' common
law tradition, but has a different history in regard to constitutional law in general and
abortion law in particular. In many substantive areas of law, there appears to be great
variation among the American states, see, e.g., David C. Brody, Criminal Procedure
Under State Law: An Empirical Examination of Selective New Federalism, 23 JUST. SYS.
J. 75 (2002) (discussing the variation in state law implementation of criminal proce-
dure reforms in light of Supreme Court decisions), perhaps more than would be
expected from Canadian courts compelled to follow the Canadian Supreme Court.
Canada is similar to the United States in having significant native and immigrant
populations, although, unlike the U.S., Canada does not have a significant popula-
tion of descendants of African slaves. Canada's "aboriginal" population was 3.3% in
the 2001 census, while its African-American or black population was only 2.2%. Sta-
tistics Canada, 2001 Census Highlight Tables: Aboriginal Peoples of Canada (Jan.
21, 2003), http://wwwl2.statcan.ca/english/censusOl/products/highlight/Aboriginal/
Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo=PR&View= 1 a&Code=0&Table=2&StartRec= l&Sort=2&B
1=Distribution01&B2=Total. Other "visible minorities," excluding Aboriginals and
African-Americans, constituted 11.2% of the 2001 population. Statistics Canada,
2001 Census Highlight Tables: Ethnocultural Portrait of Canada (Jan. 21, 2003),
http://wwwl 2.statcan.ca/english/censusO1/products/highlight/Ethnicity/Page.cfm?La
ng=E&Geo=PR&View= 1 &Code=0&Table=2&StartRec= 1 &Sort=2&B 1 =Distributi
on. In 2006, 19.8% of Canada's population was foreign-born, compared to 12.5% of
the U.S. population. STATISTICS CAN., CATALOGUE No. 91-003-XIE, CANADIAN
DEMOGRAPHICS AT A GLANCE 39 (2008), available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/
91-003-x/91-003-x2007001-eng.pdf. In 2000, the U.S. population was approxi-
mately 75% white, 12.5% Hispanic or Latino, 12.3% black or African-American,
0.9% Native American or Alaskan Native, and 2.4% of two or more races. ELIZA-
BETH M. GRIECO & RACHEL C. CASSIDY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF:
OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN 3 tbl.1 (2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/cenbr0l-1.pdf. Canada has a system of uni-
versal healthcare, although the system has been criticized for failing to deliver on its
promise of care for all. See, e.g., Douglas Martin, Healthcare in Canada: Popular Sys-
tem Now Rocked by Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1983, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/02/15/science/health-care-in-canada-popular-system-
now-rocked-by-criticism.html; Ruth Walker, Snags in Canada's Healthcare,
20091
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some informed speculation about the reasons why the American obses-
sion with "fetal protection" is not matched by other nations. Here I will
address four factors: 1) America's frequent reliance on constitutional liti-
gation as a means of achieving law change; 2) America's federal system of
government, which provides the opportunity for different legal rules to
operate concurrently within the same nation; 3) the United States'
unique prosecution system, which involves government attorneys who
are chosen locally by the electorate, as opposed to the Canadian and
French systems in which prosecutors are appointed through a centralized
national process; and 4) and the lack of a system of universal health care
and other government-funded social and economic supports. I will con-
clude with recommendations for reforming American law to embrace
the unity of interests of pregnant women and their fetuses and promote
the health of both, by providing treatment, not punishment, for ad-
dicted women.
I. Two DECADES OF PROSECUTING PREGNANT AMERICAN WOMEN
A focus on maternal behavior as the guarantor of successful child-
rearing is not new. Ever since Jean Jacques Rosseau penned Emile,
mothers have been seen as essential to creating healthy citizens and en-
suring social harmony.10 In the 1950s, American women were supposed
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Mar. 23, 2000, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
2000/0323/p 1s3.html.
France provides important contrasts with the United States and Canada, as it is
distinguished both by its civil law system and its relatively homogeneous population.
Although its history as a Catholic nation strongly influenced the development of
French law, the legal system is now nominally neutral, under the French doctrine of
religious secularism, "laicit:." See, e.g., Dominique Custos, Secularism in French Pub-
lic Schools: Back to War? The French Statute of March 15, 2004, 54 AM. J. COMp. L.
337, 346-54 (2006) (tracing the evolution of secularism, or laicitd, into a French
constitutional principle); Jennifer M. Westerfield, Note, Behind the Veil: An Ameri-
can Legal Perspective on the European Headscarf Debate, 54 Am. J. CoMp. L. 637,
646-48 (2002). France is currently struggling with how best to integrate a growing
immigrant population, many of whom are of Muslim or other faiths. See Custos, su-
pra, at 367-68 (noting that France has the largest Muslim population of any
European Union country, and describing one of the goals of France's 2004 statutory
prohibition against the wearing of religiously affiliated clothing and symbols in public
schools as "a means to preserve the status of public schools as neutral harbors of inte-
gration"). Like Canada, France has a system of universal, government-funded
healthcare. In addition, France has a significant system of economic and other sup-
ports for families with children, reflecting a strong pronatalist position. See discussion
infia in Part V.C.
10. In Emile, Jean-Jacques Rousseau urged French women to take up their duties to
breastfeed their infants. He wrote, "Do you wish to bring everyone back to his first
[Vol. 15:389
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to be at home full-time to nurture their children, but there was little
focus on women's actions during pregnancy, and women routinely
smoked and drank alcohol during pregnancy. In the early 1970s, mater-
nal-infant "bonding" was announced as essential to prevent child abuse.
Bonding required mothers to spend a great deal of time in close physical
proximity to their infants. Critics have suggested that the scientific evi-
dence in support of the bonding hypothesis was weak, but that its
adoption as a medical and moral imperative was a response to the rise of
feminism and the increased desires of many American women to have a
life outside the home." Since the late 1980s, American prosecutors, phy-
sicians, public health officials, and media have focused on the potential
for children to be harmed by their mother's drug use (including alcohol,
caffeine, tobacco, and other drug use) while pregnant.
A. The Risks ofMaternal Drug Use
Approximately 5-6% of American women use illegal drugs during
pregnancy, while 25% use alcohol.12 Drug use is common across all eth-
nic groups and classes, although black women are almost ten times more
likely to have their drug use reported to local health authorities. 3 Most
scientists agree that drug use, broadly defined, during pregnancy can
harm the newborn, but they disagree about both the severity and the
permanence of the harm. 4
duties? Begin with mothers .... The whole moral order degenerates; naturalness is
extinguished in all hearts [when wet nurses, and not their mothers, nourish infants]
.... Let women once again become mothers, men will soon become fEthers and hus-
bands again." JEAN-JACQuEs ROUSSEAU, EMILE: OR ON EDUCATION (Allan Bloom
trans., Basic Books 1979) (1762). See also REBECCA KUKLA, MASS HYSTERIA: MEDI-
CINE, CULTURE, AND MOTHERS' BODIES 30-35 (2005) (arguing that Rousseau's
vision of "the maternal body" played a central role in Enlightenment thinking and
still influences modern views of the role of mother in society).
11. See, e.g., DIANE E. EYER, MOTHER-INFANT BONDING: A SCIENTIFIC FICTION 1, 8
(1992).
12. Addiction Medicine: Psychopathology of Pregnant Women with Alcohol and Drug De-
pendencies Examined, WOMEN'S HEALTH WKLv., Aug. 23 & 30, 2001, at 8
[hereinafter Addiction Medicine].
13. Ira J. Chasnoff, Harvey J. Landress & Mark E. Barrett, Special Article, The Prevalence
of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Report-
ing in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1202 (1990) (observing
that black women were roughly ten times as likely as white women to be reported by
their physicians for using drugs, despite approximately equal rates of positive toxicol-
ogy results indicating substance abuse).
14. See, e.g., DAN STEINBERG & SHELLY GEHSHAN, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
STATE RESPONSES TO MATERNAL DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE: AN UPDATE (2000),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/maternalabuse.htm; Janet R. Hankin,
2009]
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The dangers of in utero alcohol exposure are well demonstrated, al-
though it was not until the 1970s that the causal relationship between
maternal alcohol use, fetal harm, and mental retardation became clear.5
Even infants born to mothers who drink moderately while pregnant
may experience deficits in IQ, learning, and attention, but the debate
continues about whether minimal alcohol consumption during preg-
nancy is dangerous.
6
It is much less clear whether, and to what extent, other drugs affect
fetal development. While some researchers have found that maternal
cocaine use may lead to subtle, long-lasting neurological deficits, includ-
ing deficits in "the ability to habituate or self-regulate" and small deficits
in IQ and language ability, others have found that most infants ex-
posed in utero to cocaine "catch up to their peers in physical size and
health status by age 2."'" A 2001 review article concluded that cocaine
had not been shown to cause any "major adverse developmental conse-
quences in early childhood," and that in utero cocaine exposure is much
less harmful than exposure to two legal drugs-alcohol and tobacco.'
20Of course, many more women smoke while pregnant than use cocaine.
Caffeine, a widely used drug, has recently received substantial media
attention, although the evidence of its harmful effects is quite limited
and sharply contested.2'
Today, methamphetamine is the illegal drug making headlines, and
it is said to affect many communities across the United States. It is por-
FetalAlcohol Syndrome Prevention Research, 26 ALCOHOL REs. & HEALTH 58, 58-59
(2002).
15. Steven J. Ondersma et al., Prenatal Drug Exposure and Social Policy: The Search for an
Appropriate Response, 5 CHILD MALTREATMENT 93, 94, 96 (2000).
16. Id. at 96.
17. Id. at 95-96.
18. STEINBERG & GEHSHAN, supra note 14.
19. Wendy Chavkin, Commentary, Cocaine and Pregnancy-Time to Look at the Evi-
dence, 285 JAMA 1626, 1626 (2001) (citing Deborah A. Frank et al., Growth,
Development, and Behavior in Early Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A
Systematic Review, 285 JAMA 1613 (2001)).
20. Naomi Kistin et al., Cocaine and Cigarettes: A Comparison of Risks, 10 PAEDIATRIC &
PERINATAL EPIDEM. 269, 275-76 (1996) (noting that while children exposed to co-
caine in utero were more likely to have adverse birth outcomes than children whose
pregnant mothers consumed no drugs, children whose mothers used tobacco prod-
ucts while pregnant were at risk for the same adverse outcomes as children whose
mothers used cocaine, although the magnitude of the risk was lower).
21. In January 2008 a report suggesting a link between caffeine intake and miscarriages
received wide public attention, despite the statements of some scientists that the link
might not be causal. See, e.g., Denise Grady, Pregnancy Problems Tied to Caffeine:
Long-Held Concerns About Miscarriages Are Focus of New Study, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2008, at Al0.
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trayed by law enforcement and the media as posing a risk of serious fetal
harm; however, there is scant data demonstrating a causal relationship
between exposure to methamphetamine in utero and problems of infant
22development.
Recent research stresses the multiple determinants of poor birth
outcomes, with important factors including maternal poverty, poor nu-
trition, homelessness, a history of domestic violence, and lack of
prenatal care. 3 Because it is difficult to untangle the complex causal rela-
tionships between maternal drug use and other contributors to poor
birth outcomes, 24 it is both simplistic and short-sighted to focus solely
on drugs as the source of fetal and childhood harm.
An intriguing and often overlooked issue is the risk of harm ac-
companying the use of assisted reproductive technology (ART). Twins
and other multiple births are far more likely than "singletons" to be
born earlier and smaller, and they are at risk for other neurological and
developmental problems as well.2" One out of eight American children is
22. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 1. Media stories abound concerning the risks of in utero
methamphetamine exposure for the long-term development of children. See, e.g., Ka-
tie Zernike, A Drug Scourge Creates Its Own Form of Orphan, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2005, at Al; U.S. Warns of 'Global Meth Threat,' BBC NEWS, May 10, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4757179.stm. Others have criticized this media
coverage as sensational and poorly informed. See, e.g., Daniel Thigpen, Case of Lodi
Baby Raises Difficult Legal Dilemma, RECORD (Stockton, Cal.), Oct. 14, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071014/ANEWS/
710140305 (discussing a lack of medical data showing that methamphetamine causes
developmental problems in children); Meth and Myth: Top Doctors, Scientists, and
Specialists Warn Mass Media on 'Meth Baby" Stories, 397 DRUG WAt CHRON. (Stop-
theDrugWar.org (Drug Reform Coordination Network), Wash., D.C.), July 29,
2005, available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/397/methandmyth.shtml; see
also RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE NEXT BIG THING? METHAM-
PHETAMINE IN THE UNITED STATES 16-28 (2006) (asserting that the media have
failed utterly to accurately report the science and epidemiological data surrounding
methamphetamine addiction); Newborn Hair Signals Expectant Mothers' Meth Use:
Study, CBC NEWS, Oct. 31, 2006, available at http://www.cbc.ca/health/story/2006/
10/31/meth-hair.html (noting the difficulty in determining whether a newborn's low
birthweight should be attributed to its mother's use of stimulants like methampheta-
mine and cocaine while pregnant or due to her poor nutrition and lack of "self-care"
because of drug use).
23. Because many women who use illegal drugs also abuse alcohol, there is a need for
comprehensive and intensive drug treatment programs that take into account the
complex needs of this population, which has high "[r]ates of homelessness, poverty,
unemployment, and prostitution ... [and] histories of emotional, physical, and sex-
ual abuse." Addiction Medicine, supra note 12. See also Ondersma et al., supra note 15,
at 95-97; Frank et al., supra note 19, at 1621.
24. See Chavkin, supra note 19, at 1626.
25. See Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technoogy): Should
the Law Protect Them From Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 59-61, 69-70, 77-80
2009]
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born premature and with low birthweight, with the rate of preterm
births rising 30% since 1981 26 A large percentage of children conceived
using ART are born preterm. Because both in vitro fertilization (IVF)
and ovulation promotion contribute to multiple gestations, these ART
processes also contribute to the incidence of preterm births.27 In addi-
tion, even singleton births achieved through IVF "are twice as likely to
be born preterm and die within 1 week of birth.,28 Few commentators
have suggested that the mothers who use ART should be criminalized or
otherwise compelled to change their behavior to reduce the possibility of
harm to their offspring.2' Women (and their spouses and partners) who
use ART are permitted complete choice in terms of the particular tech-
nology they use, as well as whether they will have multiple fertilized eggs
implanted and/or engage in selective embryo reduction to reduce the
chances of multiple births.3"
B. The First Wave of Criminal Prosecutions
In the last two decades, more than a hundred women in the United
States have been criminally prosecuted for causing harm to their fetuses
by using drugs while pregnant.3 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as
(summarizing data showing that up to 10% of children born using ART may suffer
some adverse consequences).
26. Press Release, Inst. of Med. of the Nat'l Acads., Preterm Births Cost U.S. $26 Billion
a Year; Multidisciplinary Research Effort Needed to Prevent Early Births (July 13,
2006), available at http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?
RecordID= 11622 [hereinafter IOM Preterm Birth Report Press Release]. The Insti-
tute of Medicine Report defines "preterm" as any birth that occurs at less than thirty-
seven weeks of pregnancy (a full-term pregnancy is 38-42 weeks post-conception). Id.
27. BD. ON HEALTH SCIS. POLICY, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., PRETERM
BIRTH: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND PREVENTION 16-17 (Richard E. Behrman &
Adrienne Stith Butler, eds. 2007).
28. Id. at 17.
29. See, e.g., Tarun Jain, Stacey A. Missmer & Mark D. Hornstein, Trends in Embryo-
Transfer Practice and in Outcomes of the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in the
United States, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1639 (2004) (noting the adverse results of the
high multiple birth rate in the Unites States, but observing that the U.S. has not
regulated ART practices "in part because of the basic belief that such decisions should
be left to couples and their physicians"). But see Rosato, supra note 25 (criticizing the
regulatory hands-off position of states and the federal government).
30. See Laurie Tarkan, Lowering Odds of Multiple Births, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/health/19mult.html. The high cost of fertility
treatment often influences women's decisions to risk multiple births, and "many peo-
ple just see the adorable twins cooing in the double strollers," ignoring the 15% of
low birthweight infants who do not survive. See id.
31. See cases noted infra in Parts II.B-D & Appendix A.
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public attention focused on an epidemic of crack cocaine use (which
disproportionately affected racial minorities and the poor), many
women were convicted of crimes such as delivering drugs to a minor or
child abuse. In every state but South Carolina, these convictions were
ultimately overturned by state appellate courts.32 In invalidating these
prosecutions, judges first cited the principle of legality to hold that a
fetus was not a child or that drugs could not be "delivered" to a minor
via the umbilical cord, emphasizing the separation of powers problem
inherent in having judges and prosecutors create law going beyond that
enacted by the legislature.33 Many judges also expressed concern that
criminalizing women's conduct beyond that already encompassed by the
crimes of drug use or possession would only drive addicted women un-
derground, away from medical help. 4 Some legislatures took a similar
approach. Missouri, for example, concluded that the problem of preg-
nant women's drug use could be most effectively addressed by making
more drug treatment resources available, and explicitly precluded the
criminal prosecution of women for harm to their children allegedly
caused by prenatal drug exposure."
32. In Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997), the South Carolina Supreme
Court upheld a conviction under the child endangerment statute for drug use during
pregnancy, declaring that a viable fetus was a "child" under the statute, id. at 778.
33. See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that mother's actions were not prohibited by statute because fetus was not a
"child" within the meaning of statute); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla.
1992) (holding that cocaine passing through umbilical cord was not punishable un-
der statute prohibiting adult delivery of controlled substances to minors); State v.
Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34-35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (emphasizing the need to deter-
mine the legislature's intent and neither limit nor extend application of the statute).
34. See, e.g., Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. Ct. App. 2006). Medical and public
heath groups also assert that such prosecutions will simply drive a wedge between
pregnant women and their physicians, and render it less, not more, likely that the
women will seek appropriate pre-and post-natal care, including substance abuse
treatment. Accord Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78, 82-85 (2001)
(observing that "an intrusion on ... [a patient's expectation of privacy in regard to
diagnostic medical tests] may have adverse consequences because it may deter patients
from receiving needed medical care"). In a separate article, I will explore at greater
length the anti-deterrent impact of criminal prosecutions on women seeking prenatal
care and substance abuse treatment.
35. State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d. 663, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007), (discussing, inter alia,
Mo. REv. STAT. % 1.205.1, 1.205.4 (2000), which provide simultaneously that
"[t]he life of each human being begins at conception" and that "[n]othing in this sec-
tion shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action against a woman for indirectly
harming her unborn child by failing to properly care for herself or by failing to follow
any particular program of prenatal care").
20091
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6 LAW
C. The Leap to Homicide Prosecutions
In the late 1990s, after a period of inaction on the fetal protection
front, prosecutors in six states undertook much more aggressive prosecu-
tions against pregnant women, for the first time seeking to convict them
of acts of criminal homicide, including murder, manslaughter, and at-
tempted intentional homicide. In these and other states, prosecutors
have also indicted women for crimes such as child abuse and drug deliv-
ery, even though these prosecutions had been declared to be legally
unsound previously, either in those states or in other jurisdictions. In
many recent cases, prosecutors have been assisted by nurses and doctors.
In 1996 Wisconsin prosecutors charged a young alcoholic woman,
Deborah J.Z., with attempted first-degree intentional homicide 6 and first-
degree reckless injury" Ms. J.Z. went into labor at a bar. After being taken
to the hospital, she told a nurse that she would drink herself and her fetus
to death. 8 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals condemned the woman's be-
havior but barred the criminal prosecution. Relying on the principle of
legality, the court ruled that under Wisconsin's "born alive" rule,3 9 a fetus
was not a human being,40 and thus the attempted homicide statute did
not apply. The court identified several other problems with the prosecu-
36. At the time, Wis. STAT. § 940.01(1) (1995-96), describing first-degree intentional
homicide, provided that "whoever causes the death of another human being with in-
tent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A felony" (emphasis added).
37. At the time, Wis. STAT. § 940.23(1) (1995-96), describing first-degree reckless in-
jury, provided that "[w]hoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to another human
being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is guilty of a
Class C felony."
38. Deborah J.Z. "allegedly told a nurse that 'if you don't keep me here, I'm just going to
go home and keep drinking and drink myself to death and I'm going to kill this thing
because I don't want it anyways.'" State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 491
(Wis. Ct. App. 1999). Deborah J.Z. also expressed fear about the pain of giving birth
and the baby's race. Id. The child was born with a blood alcohol level of. 199 and
physical features showing fetal alcohol effects. Id. at 491-92.
39. The "born alive" rule was a creature of English common law, developed by early
English commentators and made famous by Lord Coke. It required as a prerequisite
to a homicide prosecution that the child have been "born alive," defined to include
breathing on its own. It was imported into American jurisprudence along with other
aspects of the common law. See Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654, 655-61
(Ky. 2004) (describing the born alive rule and holding that it no longer made sense in
an age when fetal health and viability, as well as the cause of its death, could be estab-
lished by medical examination).
40. Deborah J.Z, 596 N.W.2d at 496. Wisconsin law defined a "human being" as "one
who has been born alive." Wis. STAT. § 939.22(16) (1995-96). The court explained
its decision as required by the rule of strict construction of penal laws and by defer-
ence to the legislature in a complex public policy area. DeborahjZ., 596 N.W.2d at
494-95.
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tion. The court first asked whether the problem of substance abuse was
better addressed through treatment or punishment, noting the concern
that threatening criminal prosecution could deter women from seeking
prenatal care or treatment for substance abuse. 1 In addition, the court
recognized the significant slippery slope problem created by the prosecu-
tion of pregnant women: since there is an extended continuum of
maternal behavior which potentially risks harm to a fetus, where on that
continuum should the line justifying criminal prosecution be drawn?
The court observed that to permit the prosecution to go forward in this
case would mean that
a woman could risk criminal charges for any perceived self-
destructive behavior during her pregnancy that may result in
injuries to her unborn child ... [, including] smoking heavily
or abusing legal medications ...... "Taken to its extreme, pro-
hibitions during pregnancy could also include ... the failure
to secure adequate prenatal medical care, and overzealous be-
havior, such as excessive exercising or dieting.
42
In South Carolina, prosecutors across the state embarked upon an
even more strident campaign against pregnant women, with conviction
and harsh sentences imposed in many cases. During the 1990s, nurses at
Charleston's main public hospital joined with prosecutors to create a
clandestine program to test the infants born to women suspected of
drug use. The United States Supreme Court struck down the program as
violating the women's Fourth Amendment rights in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston.43
41. DeborahJ.Z, 596 N.W.2d at 494-95. The court's concern is supported by a study of
low-income women who delivered their babies at an inner city hospital in Detroit.
The women studied stated their belief that if Michigan adopted a law mandating that
women whose babies tested positive for drugs would be sent to jail, substance-abusing
women would be less likely to seek prenatal care, drug testing, or drug treatment.
Marilyn L. Poland et al., Punishing Pregnant Drug Users: Enhancing the Flight fom
Care, 31 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 199, 201-02 (1993). When the study's au-
thors attempted to interview women in a state with a law that threatened
incarceration, all known drug users refused to participate in the study out of fear of
self-incrimination. Id. at 200.
42. Deborah J.Z, 596 N.W.2d at 494-95 (quoting Hillman v. Georgia, 503 S.E.2d 610,
613 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)).
43. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (rejecting the prosecution's as-
serted "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment).
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In 1999 Regina McKnight became the first American woman to be
charged with murder after her child was stillborn." McKnight was a
homeless African-American woman with an IQ of 72 and an addiction
to crack cocaine." After she went into premature labor, her child was
stillborn." McKnight and her child were tested for drugs and cocaine
metabolites were found in both their systems. 7 Although her first trial
ended in a mistrial, largely because of the weakness of the prosecutions
case on causation, in the second trial McKnight was convicted and sen-
tenced to twenty years in prison." The South Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the conviction, rejecting the defendant's argument that a homi-
cide prosecution violated the due process principle of legality.49 The
court relied on its previous decisions finding a fetus to be a child in the
context of prosecutions for other crimes to hold that it was permissible
to construe the "homicide by child abuse" statute to include cases in
which a fetus is stillborn.5" At the same time, the court, citing its previ-
ous decisions holding that a woman could be found guilty of child
endangerment based on drug use while pregnant, concluded that it was
"public knowledge that usage of cocaine is potentially fatal," and there-
fore there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Ms. McKnight,
knowing she was pregnant when she used cocaine, had acted with "ex-
treme indifference to the value of human life," the mens rea required
under the statute." The court also rejected McKnight's constitutional
arguments based on her right to privacy and her Eighth Amendment
right to sentencing not grossly disproportionate to the severity of her
44. See State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (S.C. 2003). The actual charge against
McKnight was "homicide by child abuse," a statutory enactment of the felony-
murder rule. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85 provides that this offense is committed if
one "causes the death of a child under the age of eleven while committing child abuse
or neglect, and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indif-
ference to human life."
45. Robyn E. Blumner, Moralists'New Target: Pregnant Women, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Fla.), Aug. 10, 2003, at 7D, available at 2003 WLNR 3833624.
46. See McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171.
47. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171, 173.
48. The trial court suspended the sentence upon service of twelve years in prison.
McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171, 173.
49. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 175.
50. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 174-75.
51. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 172-73 (citing, inter alia, Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d
777, 782, 785 (S.C. 1997)). The court also rejected McKnight's arguments that the
evidence was insufficient to establish causation, finding sufficient evidence to send
the case to the jury. Id. at 172. The court did not consider evidence that in about one
third of all stillbirths it is impossible to identify the cause of death. American Preg-
nancy Association, Stillbirth: Trying to Understand, http://www.americanpregnancy.
org/pregnancyloss/sbtryingtounderstand.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
[Vol. 15:389
PURSUING THE PERFECT MOTHER
crime.52 It was not until 2008, after McKnight had been incarcerated for
more than nine years, that the South Carolina Supreme Court granted
her post-conviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel, due to, inter alia, counsel's failure to present key evidence rais-
ing doubt on the causation question and her failure to challenge the jury
instructions on mens rea.53
Prosecutors have also brought homicide charges in four other states.
In 2003 a Hawaii prosecutor charged Tayshea Aiwohi with manslaugh-
ter based on her methamphetamine use while pregnant, which allegedly
caused the death of her infant two days after birth. 54 The indictment was
not brought for over two years, and Ms. Aiwohi was sentenced after
having successfully completed a drug treatment program.55 The prosecu-
tor and the circuit court judge asserted that criminal charges were
necessary to hold her accountable and to send a message to prevent
other mothers from using drugs while pregnant.5 6 After conviction, Ms.
Aiwohi received a twenty-year prison sentence, which was suspended on
condition that she comply with the terms of probation for the next ten
years.57 On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court overturned the convic-
tion. The court held, in a rather technically worded opinion, that the
attendant circumstance that the victim be a person at the time of the
52. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 176-77. In asserting her Eighth Amendment claim,
McKnight had argued that a twenty-year prison term for the stillbirth of a child was
disproportionate, see id. at 177 & n.8, given that the maximum sentence for a woman
who illegally procures an abortion in South Carolina is two years and the crime is a
misdemeanor, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-80(b) (2002). The court compared
McKnight's sentence to the sentence received by other convicted murderers in South
Carolina and by murderers of children in other states. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 177.
The court declined to consider the applicability of the abortion statute since
McKnight had not preserved the issue for appellate review. Id. at 174, 177-78.
53. McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d 354, 357-62 (S.C. 2008).
54. State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1210-11 (Haw. 2005).
55. See Aiwohi, 123 P.3d at 1210-11; Ken Kobayashi, Mother Gets Probation in Ice
Death, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Aug. 26, 2004, at IB, available at LEXIS.
56. Kobayashi, supra note 55. According to the prosecutor, the indictment was a neces-
sary "wake-up call," so that "we will never see a case like this again." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The sentencing judge concurred, commenting that "the
State, with good reason, has served clear notice that such conduct can and will result
in serious felony charges brought where the child is born alive and later dies or suffers
injury due to knowing, intentional or reckless drug use." Comment on Sentencing at
2, State v. Aiwohi, FC. CR. No. 03-1-0036 (Haw. Cit. Ct. Aug. 25, 2004),
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/attachment/43C062D78Bl 8OBO7EBE773EC5C/state
v aiwohi2.pdf. The judge rejected any suggestion that Aiwohi's addiction could be
a mitigating factor, declaring, "[Dirug usage, including the use of crystal metham-
phetamine[,] is a matter of choice and not an illness. Certainly it is a conscious choice
to obtain and use the drug initially and worse yet, while pregnant." Id. at 1.
57. Kobayashi, supra note 55.
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defendant's conduct was an essential element of manslaughter, and thus
her conviction could not stand. 8
Yet even after the convictions of McKnight and Aiwohi, many ob-
servers were stunned by the 2004 decision of Utah prosecutors to charge
Melissa Rowland for capital murder based on her decision to decline a
recommended Caesarian section (C-section) and the subsequent still-
birth of her son.59 Like Ms. McKnight, Ms. Rowland was a vulnerable
woman without an adequate support system.60 Her own mother died
soon after she was born, and Ms. Rowland had a long history of serious
mental illness and substance abuse.61 When she became pregnant with
twins, she decided to give up the infants for adoption.62 A Utah adop-
tion agency moved her from Florida to Salt Lake City, a not
uncommon practice compliant with Utah's less demanding adoption
laws.63 While awaiting delivery, Ms. Rowland lived on disability pay-
ments6 and a one-hundred-dollar weekly stipend from the adoption
agency65 and used cocaine, alcohol, and tobacco.66 When she could not
feel fetal movements, Ms. Rowland sought help at three hospitals, but
she rejected the hospitals' advice to have a C-section.67 After Ms. Row-
land delivered a stillborn son and a living daughter, she was charged
with first-degree murder.68 Prosecutors predicated their case on a theory
of maternal "selfishness," asserting that Rowland's decision not to have a
C-section demonstrated the "depraved indifference to human life" nec-
58. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d at 1210, 1223-25.
59. See Linda Thomson, Rowland Enters Plea in Death of Twin Baby, DESERET MORNING
NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Apr. 8, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR
16982308.
60. See id.; Linda Thomson & Pat Reavy, Rowland's Out of Jail, Heading to Indiana,
DESERET MORNING NEWS, Apr. 30, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR
17014187.
61. Thomson & Reavy, supra note 60.
62. Linda Thomson, Mother Is Charged in Stillbirth of a Twin, DESERET MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 12, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR 16942122.
63. Katha Pollitt, Pregnant and Dangerous, NATION, Apr. 26, 2004, at 9, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040426/pollitt.
64. Pamela Manson, Mother is Charged in Stillborn Son's Death, SALT LAKE TaR., Mar.
12, 2004, at Al.
65. Pollitt, supra note 63.
66. Linda Thomson, Rowland Case Is Called 'Political,' DESERET MORNING NEWS, Mar.
13, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR 16944885.
67. Manson, supra note 64. Prosecutors charged that she refused to have a Caesarian
section because of "cosmetic" concerns that the operation would disfigure her, but
Rowland stated that she never would have said that because she had already delivered
two children by C-section. Thomson, supra note 62.
68. Thomson, supra note 62.
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essary for murder.69 The prosecutors argued that Ms. Rowland had re-
fused the surgery because of vanity,7" and alleged, contrary to well-
established principles of informed consent,71 that Ms. Rowland did not
have a right to decline medical treatment." After three months in jail,
Rowland entered into a plea agreement by which she pleaded guilty to
two counts of felony child endangerment.73
Since the Rowland prosecution, at least five other women have
been charged with homicide based on their drug use while pregnant
when the child died or was stillborn. These include Jennifer Ar-
rowood,74 Jamie Lee Burroughs,75 and Lorraine Patrick76 in South
69. See id.; Thomson, supra note 66.
70. Thomson, supra note 62; Thomson, supra note 66.
71. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 codifies the common law of informed consent, al-
though it presumes that "when a person submits to health care rendered by a health
care provider ... that what the health care provider did was expressly or impliedly au-
thorized" by the patient. § 78-14-5(1). However, patients may still have a cause of
action for battery without meeting the requirements of § 78-14-5 if they allege that
they did not consent at all to medical treatment. Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
72. See Thomson, supra note 62.
73. Jacob Santini, Stillborn Twin Case Fades, Issues Stay, The SALT LAYE TRIB., Apr. 16,
2004, at B4, available at LEXIS; Thomson, supra note 59; Thomson & Reavy, supra
note 60. Ms. Rowland was sentenced to two terms of up to five years in prison, with the
sentence suspended while on "good behavior probation" for eighteen months, requiring
her to complete mental health and substance abuse treatment as well as a "parenting
skills" course. Doug Smeath & Linda Thomson, Rowland in New Trouble, DESERET
MORNING NEWS, May 27, 2004, at B1, available at 2004 WLNR 16958337.
74. In 2005 Ms. Arrowood was charged with homicide by child abuse; in 2006 she
pleaded guilty to unlawful neglect by a custodian and was sentenced to ten years
in prison. See Pickens County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index Search,
http://www.greenvillecounty.org/scjd/publicindex/SCJDPubliclndex39/PISearch
.aspx?CourtType=G (search last name "Arrowood," first name "Jennifer") (last
visited Feb. 18, 2009); see also National Advocates for Pregnant Women, S.C.:
Leading the Nation in the Prosecution of Pregnant Women, http://www.
advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/issues/punishment-of-pregnant-women/south
-carolina leadingthe-nation-inthe.prosecution.punishment.php (last visited
Feb. 18, 2009) (reviewing South Carolina cases, including that of Ms. Arrowood).
75. In 2006 Ms. Burroughs was charged with homicide by child abuse; Borroughs later
pled guilty. See Kelly Marshall Fuller, Test for Drugs Sends Woman Back to Jail, SUN
NEWS (Myrtle Beach, S.C.), Apr. 24, 2007, at Cl, available at 2007 WLNR
7685738 (identifying the defendant, contrary to court records, as "Jamie Lynn
Burroughs"); Georgetown County Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index,
http://secure.georgetowncounrysc.org/publicindex/PlSearch.aspxCourtType=G
(search for case number "H750929") (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
76. Ms. Patrick was charged in October 2007 with homicide by child abuse; as of this Article's
publication, her case was still pending. Lexington County Eleventh Judicial Circuit Public
Index Search, http://www.lex-co.com/applications/scjdweb/publicindex/PlSearch.aspx?
CourtType=G (search for case number "J820080") (last visited Jan. 13, 2009); see also
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Carolina, Theresa Hernandez in Oklahoma, 7 and Sheri Lohnstein in
Missouri.78
D. The Current Wave of Child Abuse 6- Child Endangerment Prosecutions
While prosecutors in some states were pursuing homicide charges,
prosecutors in other states, notably Alabama, Maryland, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Texas, and Wyoming, were bringing child
abuse and endangerment charges against women who used drugs while
pregnant, invoking legal theories discredited more than a decade earlier.
However, in most case, the charges were dismissed or the convictions
were overturned. In 2003 a Missouri prosecutor charged Keila Lewis
with first degree felony child endangerment, based on her newborn
baby's positive test for marijuana and Lewis' admission that she smoked
marijuana once while pregnant. 79 The case was dismissed because the
relevant toxicology results were ruled inadmissible."' In 2005, also in
Missouri, Janet Wade was prosecuted for felony child endangerment
based on her use of marijuana and methamphetamine while pregnant."
The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to
dismiss the charges, holding that while the Missouri legislature recog-
nized that "[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health,
and well-being," it had determined to advance those interests in a non-
criminal manner.s2 Under this legislative scheme, pregnant women were
to be given first priority in drug treatment programs, and social services
were authorized to investigate whether a newborn child was at risk from
its mother's drug use; at the same time, criminal charges and civil causes
83
of action were precluded by statute.
Sarah Blustain, This is Murder?, Am. PROSPECT, Dec. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=this-is-murder.
77. See Stone, supra note 1.
78. Tim Bryant, Mother Can't Be Prosecuted in Baby's Death, Lawyer Argues, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 16, 2007, at BI, available at 2007 WLNR 20282262; Kelly
Wiese, Missouri Lawmakers Offer Bills on Courts, Taxes, Alcohol for '08, KAN. CITY
DAILY REc. (Mo.), Dec. 4, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 24037579.
79. Brief of Amici Curiae, State v. Lewis, No. 03CRI 13048 (Mo. Cir. Cr., Chariton
County) (on file with author); see also NAT'L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN,
ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2004), available at http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/file/
NAPWAnnualReport2004.pdf.
80. Personal communications from Jane H. Aiken, Professor of Law, Washington Univ.
Sch. of Law (now at Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.), to author (Mar. 7, 2005), and
Jenean Thompson, Counsel for Keila Lewis, to the author (June 21, 2005).
81. State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663, 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
82. Wade, 232 S.W.3d at 665-66 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2 (2000)).
83. Wade, 232 S.W.3d at 665-66.
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In 2003, relying on a newly enacted Texas law, a Texas prosecutor
brought a series of indictments, charging eighteen women with child
abuse and two others with delivery of a controlled substance to a mi-
nor." The prosecutor asked local physicians to report women they
suspected of drug use,85 and many complied. In 2006 the Texas Court of
Appeals reversed the convictions of Tracy Ward and Rhonda Smith for
drug delivery, holding that the prosecution had not established the fact
of drug delivery beyond a reasonable doubt and that, under the princi-
ple of legality, it could not expand the meaning of "deliver" beyond
legislative authorization.86
In 2004 a Wyoming prosecutor charged Michelle Foust with caus-
ing a child to ingest methamphetamine.87 A judge dismissed the
indictment, ruling that a fetus was not a child under the law.88 In 2004
and 2005 a Maryland prosecutor charged two women, Regina Kilmon
and Kelly Cruz, with reckless endangerment based on their use of cocaine
while pregnant.89 Their convictions were reversed in 2006 by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals, with the court concluding that the Maryland
84. The new Texas law, Act of May 31, 2003, ch. 822, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 2607, rede-
fined the term "individual" in certain statutes to mean "a human being who is alive,
including an unborn child at very stage of gestation from fertilization until birth," id.
§§ 1.01, 2.01. The law also redefined death to include, "for an individual who is an
unborn child, the failure to be born alive." Id. The prosecutor charged at least eight-
een women with crimes before the Texas Attorney General issued an opinion
concluding that the new law neither authorized prosecution for maternal drug use
under the Controlled Substances Act nor required physicians to report such drug use.
Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. GA-0291 (Jan. 5, 2005), 2005 WL 35412 (Tex.A.G.); see also
News from Lynn Paltrow, Exec. Dir. of Nat'l Advocates for Pregnant Women, The
Real Cost of Prisons Weblog, http://realcostofprisons.org/blog/archives/2005/
01/news&fromlynn.html (Jan. 12, 2005, 17:52 EST).
85. Letter from Rebecca King, 47th Dist. Att'y, to all physicians practicing in Potter
County (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/
50abbott/rq/2004/pdf/RQ0250GA.pdf (attachment).
86. Ward v. State, 188 S.W.3d 874, 876 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); Smith v. State, No. 07-
04-0490-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2370 (Tex. App. Mar. 29, 2006). In Ward the
court declared,
We are a judicial body obligated to enforce the law as written by the legis-
lature. If that body cares to define "deliver" as including the transfer of
drugs by a mother to her unborn child through the exchange of bodily flu-
ids, it may do so. Yet, ours is not to write where it has not.
Ward, 188 S.W.3d at 876.
87. Alleged Meth Mother Bound Over to District Court Last Week, WIND RIVER NEWS
(Wyo.), June 2, 2005, at 9, available at 2005 WLNR 12005320.
88. Associated Press, Judge Drops 'Meth Baby' Charge, CASPER STAR-TIlB. (Wyo.),
Sept. 27, 2005, http://www.trib.com/articles/2005/09/27/news/wyoming/
76df395b95d0af24872570880075b959.txt.
89. Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 307-08 (Md. Ct. App. 2006).
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legislature had not made the conduct criminal. 90 A similar result was
reached in New Mexico, where in 2003 Cynthia Martinez was convicted
of felony child abuse based on her use of drugs and alcohol while preg-
nant.9' In 2006 the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed her
conviction, holding that the New Mexico legislature had not intended a
"fetus" to be a "child" within the meaning of the child abuse statute.92 In
2006 Griseliz Fernandez was charged by a New Hampshire prosecutor
with reckless conduct and endangering the welfare of a child after she
delivered an infant with traces of cocaine in its blood." These charges
were dropped when Ms. Fernandez pleaded guilty to other charges and
agreed to enter a drug treatment program.
Since 2006, Alabama prosecutors in several rural counties have
prosecuted pregnant women who used drugs under a new criminal stat-
ute, "chemical endangerment of a child." 95 The statute was apparently
designed to criminalize the conduct of parents and others who exposed
children to methamphetamines in the course of their use or manufac-
ture, but instead has been applied to women who use drugs while
pregnant. This felony charge carries a sentence of ten years to life.96 Ini-
tially only one county's prosecutor, working in conjunction with
physicians and hospital personnel, brought these cases; at least eight
women entered guilty pleas. Most recently, two other district attorneys
have initiated prosecutions, and the law's use in these circumstances is
now being challenged on appeal. 97
90. Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 310-15.
91. See State v. Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195, 1195-96 (N.M. App. 2006). The New Mexico
Supreme Court granted certiorari, 141 P.3d 1280 (2006), and then quashed it, 161
P.3d 260 (2007), making the Court of Appeals decision final.
92. Martinez, 137 P.3d at 1196-98.
93. Fetal Drug Case in Nashua Expected to Set Precedent, UNION LEADER (Manchester,
N.H.), Aug. 1, 2006, at A2, available at LEXIS.
94. Albert McKeon, County Drops Endangerment Case, TELEGRAPH (Nashua, N.H.), Dec.
20, 2006, http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061220/
NEWS01/61220003.
95. ALA. CODE § 26-15-3.2 prohibits the knowing, reckless, or intentional exposure of a
child to a controlled substance, and was apparently designed to prosecute parents and
others who exposed children to methamphetamines in the course of their use or
manufacture. Dave Parks, Law Puts New Mothers in Jail, BIPazMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.),
Feb. 14, 2008, at 1, available at 2008 WLNR 3000083; Philip Rawls, National Ire
Over Alabama Prosecuting Pregnant Moms, MOBILE PREsS-REG. (Ala.), Aug. 3, 2008,
at B7, available at LEXIS.
96. Adam Nossiter, In Alabama, a Crackdown on Pregnant Drug Users, N.Y. TiMEs,
Mar. 15, 2008, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/us/
15mothers.html.
97. Parks, supra note 95; Rawls, supra note 95.
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E. Summary Observations
What can we conclude about the continuing, intensified prosecu-
tion of women for their drug and alcohol use while pregnant? Although,
with exceptions in Alabama and South Carolina, the indictments or
convictions have eventually been declared impermissible or overturned,
prosecutors appear undaunted. What are the reasons for their behavior?
It could be that these prosecutors are motivated simply by career ambi-
tions. This Article will later consider whether the fact that American
prosecutors are locally elected, rather than appointed and/or part of a
centralized criminal justice system, explains some of the differences be-
tween American prosecutors and their Canadian and French
counterparts. It also appears that some prosecutors are legitimately con-
cerned about in utero drug exposure98 and hope to solve the problem by
publicly shaming the women involved. In addition, the American fed-
eral system provides multiple opportunities for new legal approaches to
be tried out in the "laboratory" of the states, 9 so that innovations which
are initially rejected may ultimately prevail.
However, one need not be a cynic to ask whether prosecutors could
be more effective if they lobbied for comprehensive solutions to address
the root causes of substance abuse, including domestic violence, mental
illness, poverty, and lack of access to healthcare. Most physicians and
public health authorities agree that threatening drug-abusing pregnant
women with criminal prosecution, rather than providing them with so-
cial and economic support and effective drug rehabilitation, will drive
women away from treatment, out of fear that they could lose their ba-
bies or be imprisoned.0  New research on the nature of addiction
98. For example, the Wyoming prosecutor in the Foust case stated, "We stuck our toe in
the water on this thing .... People need to understand there's a big hole in the law
that needs to be filled." Associated Press, supra note 88.
99. See the oft-quoted statement of Justice Brandeis in dissent in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932): "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal sys-
tem that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try." Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
100. See, e.g., Matt Canham, Proposed Law Targets Pregnant Drug Users, SALT LAKE TmB.
(Utah), Apr. 10, 2004, at Al, available at LEXIS; Martha A. Jessup et al., Extrinsic
Barriers to Substance Abuse Treatment Among Pregnant Drug Dependent Women, 22 J.
DRUG ISSUEs 285, 291-92, 296-99 (2003); Patrik Jonsson, South Carolina Tests the
Bounds of a Fetus's Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston), June 28, 2001,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0628/plsl.html; Kirsten Scharnberg, Prosecutors
Targeting Pregnant Drug Users; Some Fear Women Will Shun Treatment, CHI. TIB.,
Nov. 23, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WLNR 15345527; see also Thomson &
Reavy, supra note 61.
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suggests that, like many other illnesses, substance abuse is caused by a
confluence of genetic, biological, and environmental factors. It can nei-
ther be treated nor eliminated simply by punishing as criminals those
who suffer from substance abuse.'0 '
Further, courts, medical authorities, and feminists have asserted
that taking a criminal justice approach to deal with drug-addicted preg-
nant women launches prosecutors on a slippery slope. There is simply
no principled way to limit prosecution to cases of illegal drug use. Preg-
nant women who smoke or who do not follow physicians'
recommendations to have a C-section, eat properly, or exercise appro-
priately could also be prosecuted under the same theories of maternal
harm used in current prosecutions.0 2 Finally, prosecutions of pregnant
drug and alcohol abusers raise the ugly spectre of racism seen in the
eugenics movement of the early twentieth century. Not only are almost
all the women targeted in the fetal protection crusade poor and/or racial
minorities,'03 but the public reaction favoring such prosecutions is often
characterized by undisguised antipathy toward these women. Public
commentary includes eugenic responses remarkably similar to Justice
Holmes' infamous "three generations of imbeciles is enough"' 4 com-
ment in Buck v. Bell'05
101. See, e.g., Jeneen Interlandi, What Addicts Need, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 2008, at 36
(summarizing research).
102. Associated Press, Arrest in C-Section Case Alarms Women's Groups, USA TODAY, Mar.
17, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-03-17-mother-
chargedx.htm.
103. See, e.g., Chasnoff et al., supra note 13, at 1202, 1205-06; Roberts, supra note 7, at
939.
104. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
105. For examples, see the reader comments responding to a news story, Sandi Martin,
Birth Control Use Becomes Part of Pleas in Courtroom, AUGUSTACHRONICLE.COM
(Ga.), Feb. 19, 2007, http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/021907/met_1 17138.shtml,
about a South Carolina woman who pleaded guilty to the crime of unlawful conduct by
a legal custodian, and received a sentence of probation on condition that she use birth
control. One commenter wrote, "I think the system should look more into steriliza-
tion of these mothers, then [sic] making them take birth control. WE NEED TO
PROTECT THESE INNOCENT CHILDREN!!!!" Posting of zHolly220 to Mar-
tin, supra (Feb. 19, 2007, 8:29 EST). Another observed,
As a nurse who has had to help the children after being born addicted to
drugs or suffering the consequences of poor prenatal care because the
breeder (mother is not appropriate in this case) was too high to notice that
she was even pregnant. The suffering at birth and beyond (due to medical
procedures that need to be performed later in life due to many types of
birth defects associated with drug use and poor prenatal care) is like con-
tinuous child abuse. I tend to think the law is not stiff enough. The
taxpayers end up taking care of these children, who are more likely not able
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II. How AMERICAN LAW PROMOTES THE FETUS
AS A SEPARATE LEGAL ENTITY
The criminal prosecutions discussed above are only a small part of
the fetal protection war waged in recent years. °6 Civil suits, statutes, and
regulatory initiatives have all sought to separate fetuses from the preg-
nant women whose bodies sustain them.
A. American Tort Protection of the Fetus
American tort law also protects fetal interests. Early American law
declined to recognize a fetus as a legal entity.10 7 However, in 1946 a
medical malpractice case, Bonbrest v. Kotz,'08 rejected the theory that a
viable fetus is part of its mother,' 9 and most American jurisdictions
swiftly abandoned it."0 Today, every state allows a suit for prenatal inju-
ries if the infant is born alive,'1 ' and most states permit a wrongful death
suit to be brought for a viable fetus who succumbs prior to birth due to
prenatal injury."2 A minority of states also permits suit on behalf of a
to reach their full potential in life because of the effects of what these
women have done to themselves and the child before it is born.
Posting of gunfrog to Martin, supra (Feb. 19, 2007, 13:11 EST).
106. For a fuller account of the broader legal context in which this fetal protection cam-
paign has been waged, see my article, Linda C. Fentiman, The New "Fetal Protection"
The Wrong Answer to the Crisis of Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84
DENY. U. L. REv. 537 (2006).
107. For example, Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), involved a
pregnant woman who slipped and fell and then miscarried. Her four- or five-month
old fetus lived for only a short time. Id. at 14. In ruling against the plaintiff, Judge
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., observed that "no case ... has ever decided that, if the
infant survived, it could maintain an action for injuries received by it while in its
mother's womb." Id. at 15. In Holmes' view, this made sense, since "the unborn child
was apart of the mother at the time of the injury." Id. at 17 (emphasis added). For a
general survey of the evolving American tort law position, see Sheldon R. Shapiro,
Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Damages for Death of Unborn
Child, 84 A.L.R.3D 411 (2004); Jill D. Washburn Helbling, Note, To Recover or Not
to Recover: A State by State Survey of Fetal Wrongul Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REv
363, 364-65 (1996).
108. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (holding that a child born alive,
having directly sustained prenatal injuries while a viable fetus, may maintain an ac-
tion against third parties allegedly responsible for those injuries).
109. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 139-40.
110. See Washburn Helbling, supra note 107, at 365-66.
111. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E. 2d 522, 528 (W. Va. 1995).
112. See Michael P. Penick, Wrong6ud Death ofa Fetus, 19 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1,
4-7 (1993); Shapiro, supra note 107, §§ 2(a), 3(a), 4 (a); Washburn Helbling, supra
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non-viable fetus."' Other states have recognized causes of action for loss
of consortium on the part of parents whose fetus has been killed due to
the tortious acts by others. 14
Only six cases have considered whether infants should be permitted
to sue their mothers for prenatal harm. The jurisdictions are evenly split
on the subject, with three courts holding that suits against pregnant
women should be permitted in order to provide compensation to an
injured child," 5 and three holding that women should not be subject to
suit for alleged prenatal negligence. "6 These cases raise the normative
question of who is the reasonable pregnant woman, as well as the related
note 107, at 430, 431-32 tbl.; see also Meyer v. Burger King Corp., 26 P.3d 925,
928-30 (Wash. 2001) (holding that the Washington worker's compensation statute
did not bar a suit brought by a child allegedly deprived of oxygen in utero due to his
mother's employer negligence). Indeed, employers' fear of tort liability for causing
harm to the fetuses of their female employees is a major rationale of fetal protection
policies in the workplace, which exclude some women from high-paying but hazard-
ous positions. Elaine Draper, Reproductive Hazards and Fetal Exclusion Policies after
Johnson Controls, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 117, 118, 121 (2001). For a fuller dis-
cussion of the gendered nature of the construction of workplace risks, see id. See also
discussion infra at text accompanying notes 192-195. Twelve states (Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, and Virginia) require that a child be born alive before a suit for prenatal inju-
ries can be brought. Washburn Helbling, supra note 107, at 430 & 431 tbl.
113. See, e.g., Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89, 91-93 (Mo. 1995) (interpreting
Missouri's wrongful death statute to permit a cause of action for a non-viable fetus in
light of a Missouri statute of general applicability that declares that "[t]he life of each
human being begins at conception"); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d.
787 (S.D. 1996) (holding that the South Dakota wrongful death statute should be
interpreted to authorize a cause of action for wrongful death for non-viable fetuses,
and surveying the law in other jurisdictions in the process).
114. Loss of consortium has been recognized as a cause of action at least since the time of
Hammurabi, although his code explicitly calculated damages based on the social class
of the pregnant woman. CODE OF HAMMURABI % 209, 213 (declaring that a free
born woman was entitled to receive ten shekels for her loss while a maid-servant was
entitled to receive two shekels). In more recent times, courts have continued to rec-
ognize that it is the parent's, not the fetus', loss that is the subject of compensation.
See, e.g., Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Iowa 1983) (holding that a
parent could recover for loss of consortium even though Iowa does not recognize a
cause of action for wrongful fetal death, because a loss of consortium action is based
on parental, rather than fetal, loss); Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E. 2d 645, 649
(N.Y. 2004) (permitting a woman to recover for emotional injury for a miscarriage or
stillbirth due to medical malpractice, even if she herself does not suffer physical in-
jury).
115. Nat'l Cas. Co. v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A., 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001); Grodin v. Grodin, 310 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Bonte v. Bonte,
616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992).
116. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988); Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.
2d 260 (Mass. 2004); Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999).
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question of who decides what conduct is reasonable, even though courts
do not always acknowledge that they are confronting these issues.
Grodin v. Grodin"7 was the first case to permit a woman to be sued
for her actions while pregnant. The Michigan Court of Appeals allowed
the father of a child born with discolored teeth to sue the child's mother
(and his wife) for these injuries, allegedly caused by the woman's taking
Tetracycline@ while pregnant. Without analyzing the consequences of
its decision for pregnant women, the court framed the question as a
simple factual inquiry: did the woman's Tetracycline@ use constitute a
"reasonable exercise of parental discretion"?..8
Two other cases, Bonte v. Bonte,"9 and National Casualty Co. v.
Northern Trust Bank of Florida, N.A. ,2° also permitted suit to be brought
on behalf of children who were injured due to alleged negligence by
their mothers while pregnant. In deciding the cases, the respective state
appellate courts engaged in narrow doctrinal analysis in an apparent de-
sire to provide an injured child with a remedy. In Bonte, the mother was
struck by a car while crossing the street and her child was born with se-
vere neurological injuries. 12' The New Hampshire Supreme Court held
that a suit could proceed, relying on the abrogation of parent-child tort
immunity (in part in recognition of the availability of insurance as a
source of recovery) and the law that a child born alive can bring a cause
of action for injuries suffered in utero against a third party.22 The court
rejected the argument that either the unique relationship between a
pregnant woman and her fetus or the decision's potential impact on a
woman's right to control her life during pregnancy should preclude li-
ability, holding that a pregnant woman was "required to act with ... the
same standard of care as that required of her once the child is born. 12 3
A similar result was reached by a Florida appellate court in National
Casualty, which ruled that a child could sue its mother for injuries alleg-
edly caused by her negligent driving while pregnant, up to the amount
of her automobile insurance coverage.12 The court's brief opinion held
117. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869.
118. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 871. If it did, this conduct would fall within an exception to
the general abrogation of parental-child tort immunity under Michigan law, and the
woman could not be sued. Id. The court remanded the matter to the trial court to de-
termine the "'reasonableness' of the [mother's] ... conduct." Id.
119. Bonte, 616A.2d 464.
120. Nat'l Cas. Co. v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A., 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
121. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 464.
122. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 466.
123. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 466 (emphasis added).
124. Nat'l Cas. Co., 807 So.2d at 87.
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that there was no reason to "den[y] ... recovery merely because of the
identity of the tortfeasor."'' The court rejected concerns about the im-
pact of its decision on the mother's privacy and personal health, and
distinguished a case in which the Florida Supreme Court held that
criminal charges could not be brought against a pregnant woman who
shot herself and caused the death of her fetus. 2 '
In contrast, the three cases that have rejected suits brought by chil-
dren against their mothers for injuries suffered in utero have done so
after considering the consequences of allowing a child to recover against
the mother. In Stallman v. Youngquist,127 the Illinois Supreme Court held
that a child who suffered prenatal injuries in a car accident in which her
mother was driving could not sue her mother for negligence. 128 The
court criticized the Grodin decision, suggesting that the Michigan court
had confused the question of whether parental tort immunity should be
abrogated with the different issue of whether a pregnant woman owed a
tort duty to her fetus. 12' The Stallman court confronted the latter issue
directly. It emphasized that the relationship between a pregnant woman
and the fetus she was carrying was unique, "unlike the relationship be-
tween any other plaintiff and defendant," and thus could not be
analogized to other negligence situations."3 ° The Illinois Supreme Court
held that, in view of the "fact of life" that a pregnant woman's "every
waking and sleeping moment ... shapes the prenatal environment
which forms the world for the developing fetus,''. it was impermissible
to impose a duty of care on a pregnant woman."'
The court identified four threads in its reasoning. First, it would be
impossible either to limit or to define a pregnant woman's duty to her
fetus, since many actions taken in a woman's life, even prior to concep-
tion, could affect a fetus.'33 Second, it would be impossible to develop
an objective standard applicable to women from diverse socio-economic
backgrounds, who had different access to healthcare, and who might or
might not know whether they were pregnant.' Third, the court ac-
knowledged that the recognition of a common law cause of action had
125. Nat'l Cas. Co., 807 So.2d at 87.
126. Nat'l Cas. Co., 807 So.3d at 87-88 (citing State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla.
1997)).
127. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Il1. 1988).
128. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 355-56, 361.
129. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 358.
130. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
131. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
132. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 359-60.
133. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
134. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
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the potential for "unprecedented intrusion into the privacy and auton-
omy of the [female] citizens of this State."135 It held that if a duty was to
be recognized, it must be by the legislature, "only after thorough investi-
gation, study, and debate."' 6 Finally, the court urged that "[t]he way to
effectuate the birth of healthy babies is not... through after-the-fact civil
liability in tort for individual mothers, but rather through before-the-fact
education of all women and families about prenatal development."'37
In 2004, in Remy v. MacDonald38 the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court also held that a child could not sue its mother for prenatal
harm allegedly caused when the pregnant woman drove negligently,
causing an accident which led the plaintiff to be born prematurely with
adverse health consequences. 9 The court emphasized the substantial
disagreement about whether pregnant women should be held liable for
causing fetal harm. 4' It observed that there were virtually unlimited cir-
cumstances in which a woman could be sued and declared that there
was no principled way to limit the liability of pregnant women for caus-
ing fetal harm to the motor vehicle context.'' The court explicitly
rejected the reasoning of Grodin, Bonte, and National Casualty, and
found that courts should recognize "that there are inherent and impor-
tant differences between a fetus, in utero, and a child already born, that
permits [sic] a bright line to be drawn around the zone of potential tort
liability of one who is still biologically joined to an injured plaintiff"'42
The third case, Chenault v. Huie,' addressed the more difficult fac-
tual circumstances in which Huie, a pregnant woman (and her
boyfriend), abused alcohol and other drugs while she was pregnant, sub-
sequently giving birth to a child with developmental problems and
cerebral palsy.44 Huie's sister sued on behalf of the child, seeking com-
pensatory and punitive damages for Huie's alleged negligence and gross
negligence. 45 The Texas Court of Appeals declined to recognize a com-
mon law cause of action by a child against its mother for prenatal harm.
The court declared that, while "the law wisely no longer treats a fetus as
only a part of the mother, the law would ignore the equally important
135. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
136. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
137. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
138. Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 2004).
139. Remy, 801 N.E.2d at 262, 266-67.
140. Remy, 801 N.E.2d at 263-64.
141. Remy, 891 N.E.2d at 264-66.
142. Remy, 891 N.E.2d at 267.
143. Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999).
144. Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475.
145. Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475.
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physical realities of pregnancy if it treated the fetus as an individual en-
tirely separate from his mother.' 4 6 The court pointed to the difficulty of
establishing an objective, uniform standard of care for pregnant and po-
tentially pregnant women, noting the unavoidable subjectivity of jurors
(leading inevitablty to inconsistent and unpredictable jury verdicts) as
well as the invasion of women's autonomy and the interference with
women's rights to control their daily lives.' Like the Stallman court, the
Texas court held that decisions about fetal protection were best left to
the legislature, which alone could conduct the necessary "research and
analysis of scientific and medical data ... [and] evaluat[e] ... broad
matters of public policy.""14 Finally, the court was concerned that impos-
ing civil liability might be counterproductive, because women who
feared civil liability might not be candid with their physicians and thus
would receive less than adequate prenatal care.'49
Similarly, in the American workplace, efforts have been made to
protect fetuses from harm, usually by excluding women who are preg-
nant or of child-bearing age from potentially hazardous environments.'50
Unfortunately, rather than ensuring safe conditions for all workers, for
whom toxic exposures or other hazards could jeopardize the health of
their future children, these efforts have focused almost exclusively on
female employees. In International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
the Supreme Court invalidated such workplace "fetal-protection" poli-
cies, declaring that they violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 because they discriminated on the basis of gender.'51 However,
many employers continue to have such policies, effectively opting to be
sued for gender discrimination rather than facing damage suits for caus-
ing prenatal injury.'52 Almost all fetal-protection policies ignore or
discount the effects of exposure to toxic substances on men, despite the
scientific evidence that such exposure can harm the male reproductive
system and, thus, the children who are born to exposed men.'53
146. Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475-76.
147. Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 476-78.
148. Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 477-78.
149. Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478.
150. See the discussion of workplace hazards and the "fetal-protection policy" in Interna-
tional Union, UAWv. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 190-93 (1991).
151. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197-200.
152. Draper, supra note 112, at 121.
153. See, for example, the EPA's decision to cancel registration (and thus disallowing sale
and distribution) of pesticides containing ethylene dibromide (EDB) for most uses,
because of the chemical's oncogenic and mutagenic risks, as well as reproductive risks
to male workers. Notice of Intent to Cancel Registrations of Pesticide Products Con-
taining Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,234 (Oct. 11, 1983). See also
Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed. Reg. 45956 (proposed Oct.
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B. America's Evolving Abortion Law
Recent proposals for changes in abortion law also emphasize fetal
"personhood.""5 These include bills that would require women seeking
abortion to be told about fetal pain, 55 or to be given the opportunity to
view a sonogram or listen to the heartbeat of their fetus prior to decid-
ing to have an abortion,'56 or would require that a fetal death certificate
be prepared in all cases of induced abortion. 57 Supporters of these statutes
justify them as providing "informed consent," but the statutes are unusual
in mandating the substantive details of what patients contemplating a
medical procedure must be told.5 " In contrast, most American informed
consent law'59 focuses on the process of ensuring full communication
7, 1983) (proposing revision to OSHA occupational health standard to protect
against EDB's adverse effects on, inter alia, male reproductive capacity); cf Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. 187.
154. This of course includes the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1531 (2006), which redefined a medical procedure to make it more akin to birth,
for example, by using such terms as "delivers a living fetus," id § 1531(b)(1). The
law was upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
155. See the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005),
introduced by Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas, a fierce abortion opponent, as well
as Montana's Unborn Child Pain Prevention Act, H.B. 238, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mont. 2005).
156. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(B)(1)(h) (2008). Proposed federal
funding of fetal imaging machinery through grants to nonprofit organizations could
benefit so-called "pregnancy crisis centers," who have also been major beneficiaries of
grants given to organizations that promote "abstinence only" sex education. See In-
formed Choice Act, S. 340, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing additional funding for
ultrasound equipment to be used to provide pregnant women with a visual image of
the fetus); S. 755, 109th Cong. (2005) (same); H.R 223, 110th Cong. (2007) (same);
H.R. 195, 111th Cong. (2009) (same); Ziba Kashef, The Fetal Position, MOTHER
JONES, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 18-19, available at http://www.motherjones.com/
news/outfront/2003/01/ma 218 01.html. See generally NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM.
FOUND., THE TRUTH ABOUT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS (2009), http://www.
prochoiceamerica.org/assets/files/Abortion-Access-to-Abortion-CPC-truth.pdf; Abor-
tion Access Project, Impeding the Right to Choose: Crisis Pregnancy Centers (on file
with the author) (citing to additional useful sources on crisis pregnancy centers).
157. H.B. 819, 106th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2009), available at http://wapp.
capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billlnfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=HBO8 19 (requiring fetal death
certificates in all cases of induced abortion).
158. See GUTrMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERI-
ODS FOR ABORTION (Feb. 1, 2009), available at http://guttmacher.org/statecenter/
spibs/spib-MWPA.pdf (summarizing state laws).
159. Informed consent doctrine has roots in both the common law tort of battery and in
negligence. A battery is an unconsented touching and includes medical treatment
which the patient did not agree. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105
N.E. 92, 93-94 (N.Y. 1914). Informed consent also includes receiving medical
treatment from a physician who has explained to the patient those risks and benefits
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between patients and their healthcare providers rather than the content
of the physician-patient dialogue,' 60 relying on the healthcare profes-
sional to determine what information to convey to a particular patient
based on her own individual needs. Revealingly, these so-called informed
consent laws are unique in that their focus is on the interests of a third
party, the fetus to be aborted, as opposed to the patient herself.
Fetal "guardians" are another recent legal innovation, ostensibly de-
signed to protect the interests of the "unborn." In June 2003 the wife of
a Florida prosecutor sought to be appointed guardian of the fetus of a
mentally disabled patient who lived in a group home in order to prevent
the woman from having an abortion.' 6' Although the Florida courts ul-
timately rejected the suit, the case became a cause cilkbre in Florida.
While Governor Jeb Bush pushed for the appointment of a fetal guard-
ian, abortions rights advocates opposed the action, and judges suggested
that if a guardianship was approved in this case it would be impossible
to limit judicial involvement in many aspects of women's behavior dur-
ing pregnancy. 62 In Alabama some trial judges have appointed lawyers
to represent the "silent voice" of the fetus in cases in which minors seek-
of treatment that a reasonable patient would wish to know. See, e.g., Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781-82, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2805-d (McKinney 2007).
160. Some abortion statutes require that the pregnant woman be told certain details about
the fetus, such as its gestational age and its potential to survive outside the womb,
and be informed of the availability of medical assistance for prenatal care, childbirth,
and neonatal care, as well as options for child support and adoption. See, e.g., LA.
REv. STAT. § 40:1299.35.6 (2008); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990), reviewed in
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992) (finding
Pennsylvania's informed consent requirement no undue burden and therefore consti-
tutional); Tax. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. % 171.012-171.014, 171.016 (Vernon
Supp. 2008). In addition, there are other areas of healthcare in which state laws man-
date that patients (usually women) be told of alternative medical or surgical options.
These include laws addressing hysterectomy, see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1690 (West 2007); sterilization, see, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 436.225 (2007); breast
cancer, see, e.g., S.G. Nayfield et al., Statutory Requirements for Disclosure of Breast
Cancer Treatment Alternatives, 16 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1202 (1994); and child-
hood vaccination, see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-702 (2001). Medical procedures
that are less politically charged rarely have such "informed consent" requirements.
161. This attempt was rejected by the Florida District Court of Appeal in In re Guardian-
ship ofJ.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534 (Fla. App. 2004), which held that under the Florida
guardianship statute, a guardian can be appointed only for a "person," and that fe-
tuses were not "persons" under Florida law, id. at 538.
162. See Mike Branom, Judge Delays Debate on Guardian For Fetus, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale), May 15, 2003, at 6B, available at 2003 WLNR 15442738; Florida
Court Rules That Fetuses Can't Have Guardians, WOMEN'S HEALTH WKLY., Feb. 12,
2004; Phil Long, Guardians for Fetuses Debated, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 22, 2003, at
Al, available at 2003 WLNR 14850196.
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ing an abortion have invoked the judicial bypass procedure to avoid the
requirement of parental consent to abortion.
16 1
C. Other Statutory and Civil Recognitions ofFetal Personhood
In 2002 the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is-
sued regulations purporting to "clarify and expand" the definition of
"child" contained in the statute authorizing the State Children's Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP). 6" These regulations redefined "child,"
from "an individual under 19 years of age"165 to "an individual under the
age of 19 including the period from conception to birth."166 This regulatory
legerdemain was criticized as unnecessary, since Congress was already
debating several bills that would permit immigrant women who were
pregnant, the ostensible target of this regulation, to be covered under
Medicaid or SCHIP.167 It seems clear that the regulation's real goal was to
163. See, e.g., Exparte Anonymous, 810 So. 2d. 786, 795 (Ala. 2001), affd, 889 So. 2d
525 (Ala. 2003) (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
164. SCHIP Eligibility for Prenatal Care and Other Services for Unborn Children, 67
Fed. Reg. 61,956, 61,956 (Oct. 2, 2002) (codifed at 42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (2003)).
SCHIP is a complement to Medicaid, established in 1997 under Title XXI of the So-
cial Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397jj, and gives states the opportunity to
provide additional health insurance coverage to children whose parents are too
"wealthy" to qualify for Medicaid. Medicaid, which was enacted in 1965 and is au-
thorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1396v, provides
health insurance for the very poorest of American children. See also BARRY R. FUR-
ROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 418-21 (4th
ed. 2001). Both Medicaid and SCHIP are federal-state partnerships, with the federal
and state governments sharing in both the financing and administration of the two
programs. However, there are important differences. Medicaid is an entitlement pro-
gram, in which all eligible persons must receive the same benefits. SCHIP gives states
greater flexibility in choosing what services to provide. FURROW ET AL., supra, at 418-
21, 438-39. Until 2007 the Bush Administration routinely approved state requests to
expand SCHIP to cover more children at higher income levels, Joe Baker, Assistant to
N.Y. Governor Eliot Spitzer, Remarks at New York City Bar Association Panel on
New York Health Care (Feb. 7, 2008), but the Administration reversed course in the
fall of 2007 and refused to approve New York State's request to expand its SCHIP
program to include children at 400% of the federal poverty level. Congress and the
White House have been at loggerheads ever since. See Donna Smith, US. House Sus-
tains Bush Veto of Health Bill, REUTERS, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/
article/latestCrisis/idUSN23355599.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
166. 42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (2007) (emphasis added).
167. Cynthia Dailard, New SCHIP Prenatal Car Rule Advances Fetal Rights at Low-Income
Women's Expense, GUTrMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y, Dec. 2002, at 3, 5. Among the
bills pending were the Mothers and Newborns Health Insurance Act of 2002, S. 724,
107th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on Finance, Aug. 1, 2002); the Start Healthy,
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create a legal precedent for the principle that the law should treat fetuses
as persons, with all the rights that accompany that status."'
In the summer of 2008 HHS launched a similar stealth effort to
change the law so that life begins at conception. HHS drafted a proposal
to redefine birth control as a form of abortion, in a proposed regulation
that would protect healthcare employees' "freedom of conscience" by
allowing them to opt out of participating in the prescribing or dispens-
ing a prescription for birth control or "the morning-after pill. 1 69 The
draft regulation could deny their employers' Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement if they were unable to certify that they were in compli-
ance with "freedom of conscience" rules, and thus is a huge bludgeon
requiring all healthcare entities to embrace the Bush Administration's
views about when life is legally protected.170 The final regulation, issued
December 19, 2008 and effective January 20, 2009, retains the con-
science rules and written certification requirement (with some
additional exceptions).7'
In March 2004 Congress enacted the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act (UVVA), 172 which made it a crime to injure or cause the death of a
Stay Healthy Act of 2001, S. 1016, 107th Cong. (2001), H.R. 3729, 107th Cong.
(2002); the Immigrant Children's Health Improvement Act of 2001, S. 582, 107th
Cong. (2001); and the Legal Immigrant Children's Health Improvement Act of
2001, H.R. 1143, 107th Cong. (2001), all of which proposed to amend Medicaid
and SCHIP to permit states to offer healthcare to more infants and pregnant women,
including immigrant women who were excluded from eligibility under the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, tit. IV, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
168. See Elisabeth H. Sperow, Redefining Child Under the State Children's Health Insurance
Program: Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Results, 12 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y
& LAw 137, 143 (2003).
169. Ensuring that Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support
Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed.
Reg. 50,274 (proposed Aug. 26, 2008).
170. See Rob Stein, Workers' Religious Freedom vs. Patients' Rights: Proposal Would Deny
Federal Money if Employees Must Provide Care to Which They Object, WASH. POST,
July 31 2008, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/O7/30/AR2008073003238.html.
171. Ensuring that Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support
Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed.
Reg. 78,071, 78,092-93, 78,097-101 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R.
pt. 88). Several states and individuals have sued to enjoin enforcement of this regula-
tion. In February 2009, the Obama Administration announced that it was moving to
rescind the regulation. Rob Stein, Health Workers' 'Conscience' Rule Set to Be Voided,
WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/27/AR2009022701104.html.
172. Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).
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fetus while committing another federal offense. 73 While both supporters
and opponents of the UVVA acknowledged the significant problem of
violence against pregnant women, 74 opponents objected to the Act's
solution. Rather than focusing on the injury suffered by the pregnant
woman herself and providing that a person who harms a pregnant
woman who also injures or kills the fetus should receive an enhanced
penalty for that harm, 175 the UVVA makes this attack or injury a sepa-
rate crime. To do so, the UVVA defines "unborn child" broadly, as "a
member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development.,17
Critics of the UVVA and similar state statutes contend that the law ef-
fectively erases the pregnant woman as an injured party. 77 In addition,
as with the SCHIP regulation, this language suggests that the statute's
real goal is to pave the way for sharply limiting access to abortion.'
7 1
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006). The law enumerated a lengthy list of federal offenses, in-
cluding drive-by shootings in connection with drug offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 36,
violence at international airports, 18 U.S.C. § 37, and assault on a federal officer or
employee, 18 U.S.C. %. 111, 1841(b)(1).
174. H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 4 n.2 (citing Victoria Frey, Examining Homicide's
Contribution to Pregnancy-Associated Deaths, 285 JAMA 1510 (2001) (summarizing
various studies); Isabelle L. Horon & Diana Cheng, Enhanced Surveillance for Preg-
nancy-Associated Mortality--Maryland, 1993-1998, 285 JAMA 1455 (2001); Linn
H. Parsons & Margaret A. Harper, Violent Maternal Deaths in North Carolina, 94
OBsTET. & GYNECOL. 990 (1999); Andrew L. Dannenberg et al., Homicide and Other
Injuries as Causes ofMaternal Death in New York City, 1987 through 1991, 172 AM. J.
OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 1557 (1995); John Fildes et al., Trauma: The Leading Cause of
Maternal Death, 32 J. TRAuMA 643 (1992)).
175. Senator Dianne Feinstein proposed an amendment to the Senate bill to accomplish
this, which was defeated by a vote of 50-49, largely along party lines. S. Amend.
2858, 150 CONG. REc. S2804 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2004) (text of amendment); 150
CONG. REc. S3151 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004) (rollcall vote no. 61). A similar
amendment offered by Representative Zoe Lofgren was also defeated in the House of
Representatives, by a 229-186 vote. H.R. Amend. 465, 150 CONG. REc. H660-68
(daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (amendment text, statement of Rep. Lofgren, and roll vote
no. 30). See Edward Epstein, Bill to Make Harming Fetus a Crime is Passed by Senate;
Assailant of a Pregnant Woman Could be Charged with 2 Separate Federal Offenses, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 26, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/03/26/MNG475RPQE1.DTL&hw; see also H.R. REp.
No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 86.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d), 10 U.S.C. § 919a, art. 119a(d) (emphasis added). Under the
law, "the term 'unborn child' means a child in utero, and the term 'child in utero' or
'child, who is in utero' means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of
development, who is carried in the womb." Id.
177. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81
IND. L. J. 667, 694-97 (2006).
178. Senator Feinstein argued that the UVVA was a deliberate effort to undermine abor-
tion rights, by "set[ting] the stage for a jurist to rule that a human being an any stage
of development deserves ... rights under the law." Epstein, supra note 175.
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Finally, government lawyers and judges have on occasion sought to
civilly commit pregnant women in order to impose "treatment" on the
women and their fetuses,' 79 and have also issued court orders mandating
C-sections.8 While the avowed goal of these actions is to ensure the
birth of healthy children, most physicians believe that such interven-
tions are unwarranted and counter-productive.' More than thirty states
permit civil commitment based on the use of alcohol and other drugs,
182
179. See, e.g., State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997);
Marilyn L. Miller, Note, Fetal Neglect and State Intervention: Preventing Another At-
tleboro Cult Baby Death, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 71, 71-74 (2001) (describing the
case of Rebecca Corneau, a woman who belonged to a religious sect that did not
practice Western medicine and was confined in a "secure hospital facility for preg-
nant prison inmates" by a Massachusetts juvenile court judge until she agreed to
medical examination and treatment).
180. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247
(N.D. Fla. 1999) (dismissing plaintiff's § 1983 civil rights action against a hospital
that obtained a court order compelling Ms. Pemberton to submit to a C-section de-
spite her refusal to consent to the procedure); see also David B. Caruso, Associated
Press, Childbirth Choices Debated, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2004, at 19, available at
2004 WLNR 19779537 (reporting the case of Amber Marlowe, who was the subject
of an ex parte order to have a C-section because her fetus weighed over eleven
pounds, despite her having delivered six very large children previously); David Weiss,
Court Delivers Controversy; Mom Rejects C-section, Gives Birth on Own Terms, TIMES
LEADER (Wilkes-Barre, Penn.), Jan. 16, 2004, at IA, available at 2004 WLNR
19539526 (same).
181. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, H-420.969 Legal Interventions Dur-
ing Pregnancy, in HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES
427 (2008), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/polfind/Hlth-Ethics.pdf
(declaring that "[j]udicial intervention is inappropriate when a woman has made an
informed refusal of a medical treatment designed to benefit her fetus" and specifically
recognizing the need for rehabilitative treatment for pregnant substance abusers); AM.
COLL. OF OBSTET. & GYNECOL., Patient Choice in the Maternal-Fetal Relationship, in
ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 34, 36 (2d ed. 2004), available at
http://www.acog.org/from-home/publications/ethics/ethics034.pdf (stating that
"court-ordered intervention against the wishes of a pregnant woman is rarely if ever
acceptable"); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on Bioethics, Fetal Therapy-Ethical
Considerations, 103 PEDIATRICS 1061, 1062 (1999) (examining the range of medical
interventions to promote fetal health and the legal-ethical issues involved and con-
cluding that "[u]nder no circumstances should a physician physically intervene [to
insist on medical treatment] without the explicit consent of the pregnant woman
without judicial review"). However, some physicians obviously do believe that their
intervention to protect "fetal life and health" is justified, because they are the ones
who are reporting pregnant women who confide in them and admit their struggles
with drug use. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors' Orders: Unmasking the
Doctor's Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 Nw. U. L.REv. 451, 482-87
(2000).
182. See ALA. CODE § 22-52-1.2 (LexisNexis 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-64-815
(2001); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3050 (Deering 2005); COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-
1-1107 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-685 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
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and several state laws explicitly authorize such actions against pregnant
women.1 ' Most disturbingly, among the thirty-five American jurisdic-
tions which authorize individuals to execute advance medical directives
to govern their medical care if they become incompetent, two thirds of
the jurisdictions suspend these directives if the patient is pregnant,"'
denying pregnant women the right to self-determination and advance
planning available to all other adults.
§ 2212 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.675 (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-7-41
(2004); HAw. REv. STAT. § 334-60.2 (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-23-11-1 (West
2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 125.75 (West 2008); KA. STAT. ANN. § 59-29b54
(2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:54 (2008); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 § 35
(West 2008); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 41-30-27 (West 2008); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 71-908, 71-919 (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-8 (West 2008);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-22 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAws § 21-28.2-3 (2009); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-52-50 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-101, 33-6-501 to -502
(2008); Tx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034 (Vernon 2004); VA. CODE
ANN. %§ 37.2-800, -809 (West 2008); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.96A. 140 (West
2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-2 (West 2008); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.15 (West
2008); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110 (2004). Minnesota, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota have involuntary commitment laws specifically for pregnant women who use
drugs. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West 2008), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63
§ 1-546.5 (West 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-70 (2008).
183. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.01, 48.02, 48.067, 48.203, 48.205 (West 2008)
(permitting the civil commitment of pregnant girls and women); see also Tom
Kertscher, 'Cocaine Mom' Law Involved in Attempt to Detain Woman, Racine Case
Thought to Be First Time Law is Used Without Other Crime, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Nov. 5, 1999, at B1, available at 1999 WLNR 2841145.
184. For an overview of this subject, see Amy Lynn Jerdee, Note, Breaking Through the
Silence: Minnesota's Pregnancy Presumption and the Right to Refse Medical Treatment,
84 MINN. L. REv. 971, 978 (2000). Seventeen states provide statutory exceptions to
their "living will" or healthcare proxy statutes which render advance directions auto-
matically ineffective if the patient is pregnant. See id. at 978 & n.35. Another sixteen
states render the living will or healthcare proxy inapplicable in a variety of circum-
stances, ranging from a possibility to a probability that the fetus will "develop to a
live birth." See id. at 978-79 nn.36-44; accord 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 83, secs. 3
& 15 (repealing ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040 (1998), the Alaska statute cited in sup-
port of this proposition by Jerdee, supra, at 978 n.37, but enacting ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.52.055 (2005), a substantially similar provision). Minnesota gives a slight bow
to women's autonomy by establishing a rebuttable presumption that a pregnant
woman would want healthcare to be provided if there is a "real possibility that the fe-
tus could survive to the point of live birth," even if "the withholding or withdrawal of
such health care would be authorized were she not pregnant." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145C.10(g) (West 2008). The presumption can be rebutted by an explicit state-
ment to the contrary in the advance directive itself, or by clear and convincing
evidence presented at a hearing. See id. While this law endeavors to strike a balance
between the woman's interest in autonomy and the provision of a living maternal
body in which the fetus can continue to develop, it still enshrines a normative view of
women-that any "reasonable" woman would choose to continue on life-support if
it meant that her fetus would survive until birth.
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III. THE NEED FOR DIFFERENT PRIORITIES TO PROTECT CHILDREN
Many would agree that it should be the government's goal to ensure
that all children are born healthy and have the opportunity to stay that
way. However, if that were actually the case, the United States would
adopt radically different policies, offering systemic harm reduction
rather than a focusing on a handful of poor, marginalized, and drug-
addicted women.
A. The Need for Healthcare
American healthcare data demonstrate significant racial disparities
in birth outcomes and other measures of children's health, which reflect
a crisis in access to healthcare. Millions of American children do not
have a primary care physician.185 More than ten million American chil-
dren have no health insurance at all, 186 and the Bush Administration
repeatedly resisted efforts to expand SCHIP to enroll more children."'
185. KENNETH E. THORPE, JENNIFER FLOME & PETER Josmc, THE DISTRIBUTION OF
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AMONG PREGNANT WOMEN, 1999 (2001) (paper
prepared for the March of Dimes), available at http://www.marchofdimes.
com/files/2001FinalThorpeReport.pdf (identifying disparities in health insurance
coverage along racial, employment status, and income lines); Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Infant Mortality--United States,
1995-2002, 54 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 553, 553-55 (2005) (noting
significant racial disparities in infant mortality rates within and across states); 1OM
Preterm Birth Press Release, supra note 26.
186. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, ENROLLING UNINSURED Low-
INCOME CHILDREN IN MEDICAID AND SCHIP 1 (2005), available at http://www.kff.
org/medicaid/upload/Enrolling-Uninsured-Low-Income-Children-in-Medicaid-and-
SCHIP-Fact-Sheet-UPDATE.pdf. In 2005, more than 12% of children under age 18
lacked health insurance for at least part of the previous year. ROBIN A. COHEN &
MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HEALTH IN-
SURANCE COVERAGE: ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY,
JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2005 at 3 (2006). "[U]ninsured but Medicaid-eligible chil-
dren are twice as likely as those enrolled in Medicaid to have an unmet medical need,
to have not seen a doctor, and to have substantial family out-of-pocket spending on
health care." KAISER COMM'N, supra.
187. Robert Pear, Veto Stands On Measure To Expand Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2008, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/O1/24/washington/
24override.htn. Late this past summer, the Bush Administration changed its posi-
tion and declined to penalize states failing to change SCHIP policies to make it more
difficult for middle-income children to enroll. Associated Press, Children's Health In-
surance Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/
15/washington/15brfs-CHILDRENSHEABRF.html. Soon after President Obama
took office, Congress reversed course and passed an SCHIP expansion bill, which
[Vol. 15:389
PURSUING THE PERFECT MOTHER
One eighth of American infants are born prematurely, costing an esti-
mated $26 billion per year,"' and the incidence of infants born with low
birthweight is also increasing.'89 American infant mortality rates have
not improved in recent years.190
Beyond improving access to quality healthcare, the government
should concentrate on reducing environmental harms, including the risk
to all children posed by such hazards as mercury in fish, endocrine dis-
rupters, and lead from older buildings and manufacturing. Many species
of fish pose risks to adults, children, and fetuses, primarily through ex-
posure to mercury and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).'9 ' Many
widely-used pesticides are suspected to be endocrine disrupters, and
based on studies of laboratory mammals, could affect both male and
female human reproductive systems and increase the chance of repro-
ductive harms. 92 Lead poses risks to male and female workers, as well as
President Obama signed. Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Star. 8.
188. IOM Preterm Birth Press Release, supra note 26 (noting also that the rate of preterm
births has risen 30% since 1981).
189. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology and Trends
in Low Birthweight-Massachusetts, 1997-2004, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 49, 49 (2009) ("Low birthweight (LBW) (<2 ,5 0 0 g) is an important cause of in-
fant morbidity and mortality. The rate of LBW has been steadily increasing in the
United States. In 2005, the most recent year for which data are available, LBW repre-
sented 8.2% of all births, the highest level reported in the past 4 decades.") (citations
omitted).
190. American infant mortality rates basically plateaued from 2000-2005 and declined
only modestly in 2006, the most recent year for which data is available. The gap be-
tween the infant mortaility rates in the U.S. and in other developed countries is
widening. MARIAN F. MAcDORMAN & T.J. MATHEWS, NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STA-
TISTIC, DATA BRIEF No. 9, RECENT TRENDS IN INFANT MORTALITY IN THE UNITED
STATES 1-2 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db09.pdf.
191. Nick Fox, Taking Worry off the Plate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2008, at F5, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/30/dining/30fish.htm ("[A] panel convened by
the National Academy of Sciences reported in 2000 that 60,000 children were born
each year exposed to levels of methylmercury-the main variety found in fish-that
could cause neurological and learning problems."); see also Jennifer Fisher Wilson,
Balancing the Risks and Benefits ofFish Consumption, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
977, 978-79 (2004) ("Children born to women exposed to high levels of methylmer-
cury during or before pregnancy may face numerous health problems, including brain
damage, mental retardation, blindness, and seizures. Lower levels of methylmercury
exposure in the womb have caused subtle but irreversible deficits in learning abil-
ity.... PCBs [are] a probable carcinogen.... In children, PCB exposure in utero
and from breast milk consumption has been linked with neurodevelopmental delays,
impaired cognition, immune problems, and alterations in male reproductive or-
gans.").
192. SHARON L. DROZDOWSKY WITH STEVE WHIT-FAKER, WASH. STATE DEP'T OF LABOR &
INDUS., TECH. REP. No. 21-3-1999, WORKPLACE HAZARDS TO REPRODUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT 48-50 (1999).
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their children. In men, lead exposure leads to lowered sperm counts,
abnormal sperm shapes, altered sperm transfer, and altered hormone
levels. 9' The results can be sterility and infertility."' In women, lead can
cause miscarriages, stillbirths, and infertility, as well as developmental
disorders in children exposed in utero.'9'
B. The Need for Social and Economic Support
for Children and Their Families
American law also fails to promote fetal and child health through
mandated paid parenting leaves. Although the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) requires employers of fifty or more workers to grant
eligible employees twelve weeks a year of unpaid leave for the birth or
adoption of a child, or for family illness,9 the law does not adequately
respond to children's need for parental attention soon after birth and
when they are ill. Almost half of American workers are not covered by
the FMLA197 and even among those who are, only a fraction avail them-
selves of its leave provisions, because they cannot afford not to work,
thus perpetuating existing race and class disparities 9 8 No federal law
mandates paid parental leave for the period connected with pregnancy,
childbirth and the early stages of infancy,'99 and California, New Jersey,
193. NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PUBL'N No. 96-132, THE EFFECTS OF WORK'LACE HAZARDS ON MALE RE-
PRODUCTIVE HEALTH tbl.1 (1997), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
malrepro.html. Lead that workers bring home on their skin, hair, clothes, tool box, or
car can cause severe lead poisoning for family members and can result in neurobehav-
ioral and growth effects in a fetus. Id.
194. Id.
195. NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PUBL'N No. 99-104, THE EFFECTS OF WORKPLACE HAZARDS ON FEMALE RE-
PRODUCTIVE HEALTH 2-3, 4 tbl.1 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
pdfs/99-104.pdf.
196. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2612 (2006), amended
by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, sec. 585, Pub. L. No.
110-181, 122 Star. 3. However, in contrast to almost all developed countries, the
United States does not mandate paid leave. KURT H. DECKER, FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE IN A NUTSHELL 9-14 (2000).
197. Erin Gielow, Note, Equality in the Workplace: Why Family Leave Does Not Work, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1539 (2002).
198. Nancy E. Dowd, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Ten Years of Experience:
Race, Gender, and Work/Family Policy, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 219, 222-31
(2004).
199. In April 2006, Representative Caroline Maloney introduced the Federal Employees
Paid Parental Leave Act, H.R. 5148, 109th Cong. (2006). The Act would ensure
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and Ohio are the only three states to mandate any form of paid parental
leave. °
In contrast, many other developed nations either mandate or offer
paid parental leave for at least some portion of this critical stage of fetal
and child health and development. 0 In addition, many countries offer
supplemental financial or childcare support to single parents, who are
most likely to need to take a leave from work to care for a newborn or ill
child and the least likely to be able to afford to do So.22 In summary,
when compared to other developed nations, the narrow, fetus-centric
approach of the United States is seriously out of step.
IV. CANADIAN APPROACHES TO FETAL PROTECTION
AND CHILD HEALTH
A. The Legal Framework
Canada has taken a very different approach from that of the United
States in regard to protecting fetuses from harm in utero. To some ex-
tent, this difference may result from a greater reliance on British law,
and the maintenance of the born-alive rule, stemming from the fact that
Canada did not gain independence until 1867.20' However, the path of
Canadian law on fetal protection may also reflect a less punitive
paid leave for six of the twelve weeks that federal employees are authorized to take pa-
rental leave. Id.
200. Press Release, N.J. Governor Jon S. Corzine, Governor Signs Historic Family Leave
Insurance Legislation: New Jersey Becomes Only Third State in the Nation to Im-
plement Program (May 2, 2008), http://www.nj.gov/governor/news/news/2008/
approvedi/20080502.html; see also CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 3300-3306 (West
2006); Act of May 2, 2008, ch. 17, 2008 N.J. Laws 17 (making six weeks of paid
family leave available to all workers covered under New Jersey's temporary disability
benefits law); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 124.136 (LexisNexis 2007) (providing that
permanent government employees shall receive 70% of their salary for four of the six
weeks in which they are authorized to take parental leave).
201. Dowd, supra note 198, at 233-36 (summarizing European Union law, and compar-
ing, inter alia, the approach of France, which mandates maternity leave and provides
much more generous paid leaves to mothers than to fathers, and Sweden, which is
gender-neutral in its paid parenting leave policies); see also Naomi S. Stern, The Chal-
lenges of Parental Leave Reforms for French and American Women: A Call for a Revived
Feminist-Social Theory, 28 VT. L. REv. 321, 324-25 (2004) (describing the French
statutory scheme).
202. Gielow, supra note 197, at 1547.
203. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No.
5 (Appendix 1985).
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approach toward drug users generally,2° the unifying effects of a strong
national Parliament and the Supreme Court of Canada, as well as the
different system for selecting prosecutors in Canada.
For the last twelve years, the Supreme Court of Canada has es-
poused a consistent view of the relationship between a pregnant woman
and her fetus, declaring that the maternal-fetal relationship is legally
unique, as there is but one legal person, rather than two persons with
potentially adverse positions.2 5 The Court has observed, "the law has
always treated the mother and unborn child as one. To sue a pregnant
woman on behalf of her unborn fetus therefore posits the anomaly of
one part of a legal and physical entity suing itself."2 6 This position was
first articulated in the criminal law arena, and has been followed by de-
cisions in the areas of civil commitment, compelled medical treatment
of pregnant women, and tort law.
1. The Criminal Law
The Canadian Parliament has codified the common law born-alive
201
rule for criminal matters. In two important decisions, Canadian courts
have applied this rule to hold that neither a pregnant woman nor a third
party can be criminally liable for actions contributing to the injury or
204. Warren Richey, Bulging US Prisons Prompt Cross-Cultural Comparison, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Boston), June 26, 1997, at 3, available at 1997 WLNR 1368097
(noting that compared to Canada, Britain, and Germany, U.S. drug offenders were
much less likely to receive an alternative sentence and drug treatment).
205. See, e.g., Winnipeg Child & Family Servs. (Nw. Area) v. G. (D.F.), [1997] 3 S.C.R.
925, 944-45 27-29 (Can.); Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dobson, [1999]
2 S.C.R. 753, 753 1 1 (Can.).
206. Winnipeg Child &Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 945 27.
207. See the discussion of the English genesis of this rule, supra note 39, as well as section
223 of the Canadian Criminal Code:
(1) A child becomes a human being within the meaning of this Act when it
has completely proceeded, in a living state, from the body of its mother,
whether or not
(a) it has breathed;
(b) it has an independent circulation; or
(c) the navel string is severed.
(2) A person commits homicide when he causes injury to a child before or
during its birth as a result of which the child dies after becoming a hu-
man being.
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 223 (1985).
[Vol. 15:389
PURSUING THE PERFECT MOTHER
death of a fetus. °8 In Regina v. Sullivan, °9 the Supreme Court of Can-
ada held that two midwives who were negligent in their assistance at a
home birth could not be convicted of "criminal negligence causing the
death of a person.''2" The Court upheld the British Columbia Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the foetus2 was not a person for purposes of
the statute since it had died in the birth canal and thus was not born
alive.2'1 2 In its decision the Court relied solely on the legislative history of
the Criminal Code and did not reach the policy issues raised by holding
211that a foetus was not a person.
Regina v. Drummonat 4 is the only reported case in which a Cana-
dian prosecutor indicted a pregnant woman for causing harm to her
foetus. Even in a prosecution in which there was arguably evidence of
intent to cause harm (rather than reckless indifference), the Ontario
Court of Justice prohibited the prosecution of Brenda Drummond, a
mentally ill pregnant woman. Ms. Drummond inserted a pellet rifle into
her vagina and fired, causing a pellet to be lodged in the foetus' brain."5
The foetus was delivered alive, and subsequently had surgery to remove
the pellet.16 The prosecutor charged Ms. Drummond with attempted
murder,2 7 and defense counsel moved to quash for failing to "disclos[e]
208. This is very different than the position of a majority of states and the federal govern-
ment in the United States, both of which accept and promote a distinction between
actions done to the fetus by a third party and the woman who carries it. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2008) (describing the crime of murder as including the
unlawful killing of a fetus but excluding instances of lawful abortion and where the
mother aided or consented); Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1841 (2006).
209. R. v. Sullivan, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 489 (Can.).
210. At the time of the events at issue, section 203 of chapter C-34 of the Canadian
Criminal Code provided, "Every one who by criminal negligence causes death to an-
other person is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life."
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 203 (1970) (current version at R.S.C., ch. C-46,
§ 220 (1985), amended by 1995 S.C., ch. 39, § 141).
211. In discussing Canadian law, I will be using the Canadian spelling of "foetus,"rather
than the American "fetus."
212. Sullivan, [1991] 1 S.C.R. at 499, 502-03.
213. Sullivan, [1991] 1 S.C.R. at 502-03. The Supreme Court concluded that the British
Columbia Court of Appeal had "reviewed and analyzed the law on this point in a
very thorough manner," Sullivan, [19911 1 S.C.R. at 502, and the lower court's opin-
ion provides a useful overview of British and Canadian common law and statutory
enactments with regard to causing injury or death to a fetus. R. v. Sullivan, [1988] 31
B.C.L.R.2d 145, 9l 10-20, 22-41 (C.A.); see also Sullivan, [19911 1 S.C.R. at 499-
500.
214. R. v. Drummond, [1996] 143 D.L.R. (4th) 368 (Ont. Ct. Just.).
215. Drummond, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 2.
216. Drummond, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 1 2.
217. Drummond, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 4.
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an offence known in law."2 8 Relying on Regina v. Sullivan, the court
held that the crime of attempted murder could not be established, be-
cause a foetus was not a human being under the Canadian Criminal
Code, and therefore, at the time the mother fired the pellet rifle, she
could not form the necessary intent to murder, i.e., to kill a human be-
219ing.
Advocates of "foetal rights" have endeavored to change the Cana-
dian born-alive rule. In 2007 a Conservative Member of Parliament
introduced a "private members"' bill, the Unborn Victims of Crime Act,
which would make it a crime punishable by life imprisonment to cause,
"directly or indirectly, . . . the death of a child during birth or at any
stage of development before birth while committing or attempting to
commit an offense against the mother of the child, who the person
knows or ought to know is pregnant," if the person shows "reckless dis-
regard for the life or safety of the child., 220 Making clear its purpose to
establish a foetus as a juridical person, the proposed law also provides
that "[i]t is not a defence to a charge under this section that the child is
not a human being,, 22' and "[an offence referred to in this section
committed against a child is not included in any offence committed
against the mother of the child.,
222
2. Tort Liability and Civil Commitment
In the late 1990s, the Supreme Court of Canada first confronted
the question of whether a foetus should be considered a legal person in
the common law context and reached a result consistent with its abor-
tion jurisprudence. In Dobson v. Dobson,223 the Court held that the
foetus should not be considered a person separate from its mother. The
Court stated that "[t] he relationship between a pregnant woman and her
218. Drummond, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 11.
219. Drummond, 143 D.L.Rt (4th) 368, tI9 28-32, 35-44. Ultimately, Ms. Drummond,
whose lawyer asserted that she was so depressed that she did not know that she was
pregnant, pleaded guilty to failing to provide the necessities of life to her son after he
was born; she was not sentenced to jail. Meant Suicide When Son Hit, Woman Says;
Unaware She Was Pregnant, Lawyer Tells Court, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 4, 1997, at
A10, available at LEXIS.
220. Unborn Victims of Crime Act, C-484, 39th Par., 2d Sess., sec. 3, § 238.1(1) (Can.
2007); see also Parliament of Canada, Member of Parliament Profile: Ken Epp,
http://webinfo.parl.gc.ca/MembersOfParliament/ProfileMP.aspx?Key=78339&Lang
uage=E (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
221. C-484, sec. 3, § 238.1(5).
222. Id. at sec. 3, § 238.1(6).
223. Dobson (Litig. Guardian oO v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753 (Can.).
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foetus is unique and innately recognized as one of great and special im-
portance to society. 221 In Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest
Area) v. G. (D.F),225 the Court declared, "Before birth the mother and
unborn child are one in the sense that '[t]he "life" of the foetus is inti-
mately connected with, and cannot be regarded in isolation from, the
life of the pregnant woman. ' ' 221 In this case, the Court held that a preg-
nant woman addicted to sniffing glue could not be civilly committed in
order to receive substance abuse treatment against her will. 2  In Dobson,
the Court held that a pregnant woman could not be found liable in tort
for alleged negligence while driving which caused harm to her foetus,
even though a third party who drove negligently could be held liable.
Winnipeg Child & Family Services presented a tragic set of circum-
stances. Ms. D.EG. was a young aboriginal woman221 who was addicted
to sniffing glue and had already given birth to three children, two of
whom had been injured as a result of their exposure to solvents in229
utero. When Ms. D.F.G. became pregnant again she intermittently
both sought and rejected treatment for her addiction. Treatment was not
initially available, but after arranging for her admission to a treatment
program, the local child welfare agency came to Ms. D.FG.'s home to
224. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 759 T 1.
225. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs. (Nw. Area) v. G. (D.F.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925
(Can.).
226. Winnipeg Child &Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 944 27 (citing Paton v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 8416/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 408, 415 (1980)).
227. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 933 1 1, 939-40 91 15-17,
954-55 47-5 1. In this decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the conclusion
reached by most, but not all, lower courts, that the term "child" within the meaning
of various provincial child protection statutes did not include a foetus and that
courts' parenspatriae jurisdiction was not broad enough to authorize a Caesarian sec-
tion without the mother's consent, e.g., Re Baby R., [1988] 30 B.C.L.R.2d 237 (Sup.
Ct.), or other involuntary detention of a pregnant woman for the benefit of her foe-
tus, e.g., Re A., [1990] 75 O.R.2d 82 (Unif. Fam. Ct.). But see Children's Aid Soc'y
of Belleville v. T. (L.), [19871 59 O.R.2d 204 (Prov. Ct. Fam. Div.) (finding an "un-
born child" in need of protection, under the authority of the Child and Family
Services Act).
228. Canadian cases and commentators refer to native peoples either as "First Nations" or
as "aboriginals." See, e.g., Lise Gotell, Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian
Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women, 41 AKRON L. REV.
865, 865, 882, 889 (2008) (discussing the case of R. v. Edmondson, [2005] 257 Sask.
R. 270 (C.A.), and describing the victim as both an "aboriginal girl" and as a "Yellow
Quill First Nation girl").
229. Winnipeg Child &Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R at 933-34 91 1, 5; Frangoise Bay-
lis, Commentary, Dissenting with the Dissent: Winnipeg Child and Family Services
(Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), 36 ALTA. L. REv. 785, 785-86 (1998).
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take her to a treatment facility.230 Intoxicated at the time, D.F.G. refused
to enter treatment.23 ' The agency sought a court order to detain her for
treatment at a health centre until the birth of her child.232 The superior
court judge granted the request, relying on provincial mental health law
and the doctrine of parens patriae to justify its order for civil commit-
233
ment.
On appeal, both the Manitoba Court of Appeal 23 and the Supreme
Court of Canada rejected the trial court's approach. The Supreme Court
began with the premise that "the [common] law of Canada does not
recognize the unborn child as a legal or juridical person."2 35 After asking
whether the rule should be changed to allow a remedy for circumstances
in which "a mother is acting in a way which may harm her unborn
child, 236 the Court concluded that it should not.237 The Court empha-
sized that "[a]scribing personhood to a foetus in law is a fundamentally
normative task. It results in the recognition of rights and duties-a mat-
ter which falls outside the concerns of scientific classification."
231
The Court gave four reasons for declining to hold that a foetus
should be considered a person with rights separate from those of its
mother. First, the Court held, as a matter of separation of powers, that
the legislature was in a better position than the courts to weigh the pol-
icy implications of law change. 239 Nonetheless, commenting on those
policy concerns, the Court observed that a decision upholding the civil
commitment of pregnant women might be counterproductive, either
because women with substance abuse problems might not seek prenatal
care out of fear of detection and consequent involuntary commitment,
or because drug-addicted women might choose abortion rather than be
230. Winnipeg Child &Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 934 T 5, 964 77; Baylis, supra
note 229, at 786.
231. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 934 5, 964 77; Laura Shan-
net, Commentary, Pregnancy Intervention and Models of Maternal-Fetal Relationship:
Philosophical Reflections on the Winnipeg C.F.S. Dissent, 36 ALTA. L. REv. 751, 752
(1998).
232. Winnipeg Child 6-&Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 926.
233. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 935 6. After two days, the
order was stayed and ultimately overturned on appeal. Id. at 933 2. However, Ms.
D.F.G. remained at the health centre for several days, stopped sniffing glue, and
"gave birth to an apparently normal child." Id. at 933-34 T 2.
234. Child & Family Servs. of Winnipeg Nw. v. D.F.G., [1996] 113 Man. R.2d 3 (Man.
Ct. App.).
235. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 937 11.
236. Winnipeg Child & Family Sews., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 935 5, 940-44 19 18-26.
237. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 954 I 47-48.
238. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 938 9 12 (quoting Tremblay v.
Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530, 553 (Can.)).
239. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 941 T 20.
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forced to give up drugs."' Second, viewing its decision on civil com-
mitment as a matter of tort law,' the Court noted that neither England
nor Australia, both common law countries, permit a child to sue for
prenatal injuries until born alive.242 Third, and most importantly, the
Court noted that once a decision was made to treat the foetus as a per-
son separate from its mother, it would be impossible to find a principled
basis on which to limit tort liability.24 Fourth, imposing such liability
would conflict with women's rights to autonomy and equality.2"
Combining these latter two concerns, the Court described the slip-
pery slope onto which courts would be launched in trying to decide
whether a pregnant woman should face the possibility of tort liability or
involuntary civil commitment:
One faces . . . the "spectre of mothers being sued by their chil-
dren for various activities or lifestyle choices, such as smoking,
drinking and the taking or refusal of medication, during preg-
nancy that injure the child, with the result that mothers will
be unable to control their own bodies and make autonomous
choices[.]" ..245
... "[A woman] could ... be held liable for any behavior
during pregnancy having potentially adverse effects on her fe-
tus, including failing to eat properly, using prescription,
nonprescription and illegal drugs, smoking, drinking alcohol,
exposing herself to infectious disease or to workplace hazards,
engaging in immoderate exercise or sexual intercourse, residing
at high altitudes for prolonged periods, or using a general an-
esthetic or drugs to induce rapid labor during delivery. 246
240. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 952 1 44.
241. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 936 I 9,939-40 1 15-17.
242. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 942-43 I 22.
243. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 943 24, 946-47 133, 949-50
1I1 38-40.
244. Winnipeg Child &Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 947-52 34, 37-39, 42.
245. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 947 34 (quoting Dobson
(Litig. Guardian of) v. Dobson, [1997] 189 N.B.R.2d 208 (C.A.)) (citations omit-
ted).
246. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 950 39 (quoting Dawn E.
Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women "s Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 606-07 (1986)).
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Importantly, the Court also challenged the myth of autonomous
choice facing drug-addicted women, and urged that the policy decisions
about how best to protect fetuses be made in the actual context of preg-
nant substance abusers' lives. The Court observed,
[L]ifestyle "choices" like alcohol consumption, drug abuse,
and poor nutrition may be the products of circumstance and
illness rather than free choice capable of effective deterrence by
the legal sanction of tort.... ["]Treating pregnant substance
abusers as fetal abusers ignores the range of conditions that
contribute to problems like drug addiction and lack of nutri-
tion, such as limited quality pre-natal care, lack of food for
impoverished women, and lack of treatment for substance
abusers.
247
Finally, the Court also considered the question of whether a parens
patriae theory justified the involuntary commitment of pregnant
women. The Court concluded that it did not,248 holding:
[T]he invasion of liberty involved in making court orders af-
fecting the unborn child is of a different order than the
invasion of liberty involved in court orders relating to born
children.... The court cannot make decisions for the unborn
child without inevitably making decisions for the mother her-
self. The intrusion is therefore far greater than simply limiting
the mother's choices concerning her child... [and] would se-
riously intrude on the rights of women. 49
The Supreme Court used a similar analytical approach in Dobson v.
Dobson.2 '0 The case raised the question of whether a child who suffered
permanent brain injuries due to his mother's allegedly negligent driving
while pregnant could sue her for this prenatal harm.25" ' The Supreme
247. Winnipeg Child & Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.Rt at 950-51 141 (quoting Julia E.
Hanigsberg, Power and Procreation: State Interference in Pregnancy, 23 OTrAWA L.
Rav. 35, 53 (1991)).
248. Winnipeg Child &Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.Rt at 954-60 J91 49-57.
249. Winnipeg Child &Family Servs., [1997] 3 S.C.R at 959-60 56 (punctuation omit-
ted).
250. Dobson (Litig. Guardian of) v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753 (Can.).
251. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 760 91 2-4. The two lower courts ruled that the child
could sue his mother for injuries incurred while he was in utero. The New Brunswick
trial court permitted the child to sue, analogizing to established precedent that per-
mitted a child, once born, to sue third parties for injuries suffered prior to birth.
Dobson v. Dobson, [1997] 186 N.B.R.2d 81 (QB.) (citing Montreal Tramways Co.
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Court reversed the lower courts' decisions to let the suit go forward,
holding that, due to the unique nature of the relationship between a
pregnant woman and her foetus, the woman cannot be held liable for
allegedly tortious conduct while the foetus was in utero.252 Although the
Court conceded that children had been permitted to sue third parties
for negligently caused prenatal injuries, it found that these cases were
readily distinguishable from suits for injuries allegedly caused by a preg-
nant woman's negligence.2 " The Court declared, "There is no other
relationship in the realm of human existence which can serve as a basis
for comparison."
254
In considering whether tort duties should be imposed on pregnant
women, the Dobson court first assumed arguendo that a pregnant
255
woman and her foetus could be treated as separate entities. It con-
cluded that, under such circumstances, there would be no limit to a
woman's potential liability, due to the extraordinarily close physical
proximity between the woman and her foetus and the enormous range
of actions which the woman could take which could have a detrimental
effect on foetal development. 256 The Court noted, "Everything the preg-
nant woman eats or drinks, and every physical action she takes, may
affect the foetus. 257 The Court identified two important public policy
concerns "militat[ing] against the imposition of maternal tort liability
for prenatal negligence[:] ... (1) the privacy and autonomy rights of
women and (2) the difficulties inherent in articulating a judicial stan-
dard of conduct for pregnant women.25" Addressing women's interest in
autonomy, the Court emphasized that simply because a woman is preg-
nant she does not lose "the right to make personal decisions, to control
[her] bodily integrity, and to refuse unwanted medical treatment.,
2 59
The Court linked these concerns to the difficulty in developing a
workable judicial standard of conduct for pregnant women, finding that
it would be impossible to articulate an objective standard, since every
v. LUveill6, [1933] S.C.RI 456 (Can.)). The New Brunswick Court of Appeal upheld
this decision, asserting that, because the mother owed a general duty not to drive neg-
ligently, it was appropriate to allow her child, injured while a foetus, to bring an
action against her for breach of that general duty. Dobson v. Dobson, [1997] 189
N.B.R.2d 208, 216 (C.A.).
252. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 796-97 1 76-77.
253. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 770-72 1 26-29.
254. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R at 769 91 25.
255. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 767 91 20.
256. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.Rt at 770-71 11 27-28, 798 9191 79-80.
257. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 770 1 27.
258. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 768 9 21.
259. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 774 1 32 (quoting ROYAL COMM'N ON NEW REPROD.
TECHS., 2 PROCEED WITH CARE 955-56 (1993)).
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pregnant woman's life is different; there are women who are well-
educated and not, those who are rich and poor, and those with and
without access to good healthcare and prenatal care.6 The Court also
observed that any "reasonable pregnant woman" standard that would
develop would inevitably be interpreted in light of the trier of fact's
prejudices about proper conduct of pregnant women. 26 As in Winnipeg
Child & Family Services, the Court invoked the slippery slope, conclud-
ing that there was no principled way to identify conduct on the part of a
pregnant woman that was or was not negligent, and consequently re-
fused to recognize a cause of action in tort.262 The Court did hold out
the possibility that Parliament could develop narrowly tailored legisla-
tion to address the needs of brain-injured children, as had the
Parliament of the United Kingdom in enacting the Congenital Disabili-
ties Act when it established an explicit "motor vehicle" exception to the
general principle that women have tort immunity for damages to their
fetuses in utero. The Court concluded that such a legislative solution
could meet both separation of powers concerns and permit a more care-
ful consideration of the public policy issues.264
3. Abortion Law
In its landmark 1988 decision in Regina v. Morgentaer, the Su-
266preme Court of Canada invalidated Canada's criminal abortion law.
260. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 785 154.
261. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 784-85 53.
262. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 788-90 91 60-62, 792 91 66.
263. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 791-94 '1 64-70.
264. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 791-94 '9 64-70. As described by the Court, the Con-
genital Disabilities Act creates a very limited exception to the general rule of tort law
that pregnant women are not liable for negligent conduct vis-a-vis their foetuses, ex-
cept in the limited circumstances in which they are operating a motor vehicle, and
then only to the limits of their insurance policy. Id. at 791 91 64-65. The Court
took pains to distinguish the approach taken in the United Kingdom from that pro-
posed by the plaintiff in Dobson, both because the former was based on a legislative
act, rather than a judicial decision, id. at 791 91 64, and because it was devised on in-
surance, rather than tort, principles, consistent with the British system of mandatory
motor vehicle insurance, id at 792-93 91 67. The sole goal of the Congenital Dis-
abilities Act was to provide monetary compensation to foetuses who suffered injury in
utero in an automobile accident. Id. at 793 91 68.
265. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.).
266. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 251 (1970) (current version at R.S.C. ch C-46,
§ 287 (1985), amended by 1993 S.C., ch. 28, § 78, 1996 S.C., ch. 8, § 32, 2002
S.C., ch. 7, § 141). While the Morgentaler court invalidated the law, the Parliament
has not repealed it.
[Vol. 15:389
PURSUING THE PERFECT MOTHER
The abortion law placed the decision about whether a woman could
have an abortion solely within the hands of a three-member physician
committee. 6 ' The Morgentaler court found that this law violated
women's right to "security of the person" under section 7 of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms268 and did so in contravention of
the principles of fundamental justice.269 Nor could the law be "salvaged"
under section 1 of the Charter as a law "of sufficient importance to war-
rant overriding a constitutionally protected right," with "the means
chosen in overriding the right ... reasonable and demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society., 270 Under the law, many women faced
considerable delay in obtaining an abortion, as many needed to seek
permission for abortion at multiple hospitals because of uncertainty
about whether permission would be granted.271 In addition to the psy-
chological stress caused by uncertainty and delay, many women were
also burdened by the fact that the medical procedure they sought was
regulated by the criminal law.272 The Court concluded that by removing
women entirely from the decision-making process, this system deprived
them of the "security of the person" protected by section 7 of the Char-
273ter.
The Court's reasoning was stated succinctly by concurring Justice
Beetz: "A pregnant woman's person cannot be said to be secure if, when
her life or health is in danger, she is faced with a rule of criminal law
which precludes her from obtaining effective and timely medical treat-
ment., 274 Concurring Justice Wilson was the strongest in her critique of
the abortion law,275 although she nonetheless recognized the state inter-
est in protecting the potential human life that a foetus represented.276
267. § 251(4), (6); Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 64, 92-100 (discussing the committee
requirements of§ 251).
268. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Charter].
269. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 56-57, 70-73, 81-82.
270. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 73, 75-76, 82.
271. Morgentaler, [19881 1 S.C.R. at 57-58.
272. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 55-57, 89-90, 104-05.
273. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 164-72.
274. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 90.
275. Justice Wilson concluded that the criminal abortion provision contravened both the
security and liberty interests protected by section 7. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30
at 162-63. Relying on John Stuart Mill and on American jurisprudence which had
developed a constitutional right to privacy, Justice Wilson declared that section 7 of
the Charter "guarantees to every individual a degree of personal autonomy over im-
portant decisions intimately affecting their private lives," id. at 171, and that this
liberty interest includes "the decision of a woman to terminate her pregnancy," id. See
also id. at 164-72.
276. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 181.
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Justice Wilson reasoned that the governmental interest in protecting that
life must vary with the stage of foetal development, suggesting in dicta
that the governmental interest did not become compelling until some-
where in the second trimester.2 7 r •! 2781
A year later, in Tremblay v. Daigle, the Court directly addressed
the question of the legal status of the foetus that it had avoided in
Morgentaler. In Daigle, a pregnant woman's physically abusive male
partner sought an injunction to prevent her from having an abortion.
After a lengthy litigation process, played out in the Canadian press,
2 8 0
the Supreme Court ruled that the man had no right to prevent the abor-
tion because, under Canadian and Quebecois law, a foetus was not a
"juridical person," with rights and legal protections while in utero. 2s8
Despite the Morgentaler decision invalidating Canada's criminal
abortion law, many women still find it difficult to access abortion ser-
vices in Canada, due to strong opposition to abortion in some provinces
212
and the poverty and geographic isolation of many women. The Can-
ada Health Act establishes federal standards for medically necessary
services (including abortion), which must be met before provinces can
be reimbursed by the federal government for the services they provide
patients through provincial insurance plans.283 Provinces vary widely in
the extent to which they fund abortions, often distinguishing between
hospitals, which are fully funded, and clinics, where funding may be
284partial. Even in provinces which fully fund abortion services, there are
few hospitals and clinics which perform abortions, leading to significant
277. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 181-83.
278. Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 (Can.).
279. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. at 536-37.
280. See Alison Harvison Young, New Reproductive Technologies in Canada and the United
States: Same Problems, Different Discourses, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 43, 72
n.155 (1998).
281. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. at 552-70. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed
prior Canadian decisions, as well as precedential French and British legislative and
judicial authorities, and declared that there was no basis for finding that a foetus had
legal personhood under Quebec law. Id.
282. Laura Eggertson, Abortion Services in Canada: A Patchwork Quilt with Many Holes,
164 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 847, 847-48 (2001), available at
http:l/www.cmaj.calcgi/reprintl 164161847; see generally Sanda Rodgers, Abortion De-
nied: Bearing the Limits of Law, in JUST MEDICARE: WHAT'S IN, WHAT'S OUT, How
WE DECIDE 107 (Colleen M. Flood ed., 2006).
283. See Canada Health Act, R.S.C., ch. C-6 (1985); Rodgers, supra note 282, at 115,
128-29 nn.71-75.
284. British Columbia and Ontario, for example, fund abortions fully under provincial
health insurance plans, while other provincial health plans do not fully cover abor-
tions performed at clinics, which may be more likely to be found in rural areas.
Eggertson, supra note 282, at 847.
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waiting times.285 Prince Edward Island has no hospital or clinic where
abortions are performed, so women must leave the province to seek care,
leading to waiting times of up to a month.2 " Less than twenty percent of
all Canadian hospitals perform abortions28 ' and even among hospitals
which do provide these services, some have imposed additional require-t 288
ments on women seeking an abortion, contrary to law. For young and
poor women, as well as those in rural areas, these procedural hurdles,
increased costs, and the burdens of travel are often insuperable obstacles
to obtaining an abortion. 9
B. Healthcare Access
Of course, the fact that Canadian courts do not recognize foetuses
as juridical persons tells us nothing about whether pregnant women re-
ceive adequate healthcare under the Canadian healthcare system.
Although Medicare, as the Canadian health system is known, provides
210
universal coverage, in reality, access to appropriate healthcare and to
other prerequisites for health is not equal across class and racial lines. In
addition to the problems with abortion access noted above, there are
many people who do not receive appropriate healthcare under the Ca-
nadian system. Aboriginal peoples who live on reserves (and are the
direct responsibility of the federal government) are particularly lacking
in adequate healthcare, housing, and nutrition, and their health status
reflects these deficits.291
285. See id. at 849 (noting that only three out of ninety-nine hospitals perform abortions
in Alberta, and that there are only two clinics in the entire province, leading to wait-
ing times of two or more weeks even in a large city like Calgary).
286. Id.
287. Rodgers, supra note 282, at 113 (citing CANADIAN ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION
LEAGUE, PROTECTING ABORTION RIGHTS IN CANADA (2003), available at
http://www.canadiansforchoice.ca/caralreport.pdO.
288. Id. at 113-14 (citing, inter alia, CANADIAN ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, supra
note 287).
289. Eggertson, supra note 282, at 848; see also Rodgers, supra note 282, at 112.
290. Personal communication from Bernard Dickens, Professor Emeritus, Univ. of To-
ronto, to the author. Under the Canada Health Act, the federal government provides
partial reimbursement to provinces for providing "reasonable access" to "medically
necessary" healthcare services, providing that the provinces meet minimum federal
standards. Id.; Canada Health Act, ch. C-6, §§ 2, 12. As noted, in the context of
abortion, provinces are free to provide greater or fewer services if they do not seek
federal reimbursement. Dickens, supra.
291. Sanda Rodgers, Commentary, Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. D.F.G.: Ju-
ridical Interference with Pregnant Women in the Alleged Interest of the Fetus, 36 ALTA L.
RaV. 711, 723 (1998).
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At present, there are inadequate treatment resources for alcohol and
other drug addictions across Canada.292 Women who acknowledge their
addiction and seek treatment face "devastating barriers to treatment.
2 93
Women are inhibited in their reporting of substance abuse because of
the stigma and negative stereotypes about their behavior and because
they fear losing custody of their children. 94 As in the United States,
poor women and women of color are significantly more likely to be
screened for substance abuse than middle class women. 295 Further,
treatment programs are not designed to reflect the special factors that
predispose women to substance abuse compared to men, or to offer
more supportive, less judgmental interventions to protect women and
their fetuses.2  Both epidemiological studies and a review of the cases in
which judicial intervention to protect the foetus has been sought suggest
a strong connection between domestic violence and the use of alcohol
and other drugs by pregnant women. 297 Nonetheless, Canada is attempt-
ing to address its growing substance abuse problem. In 2007 it
announced a national campaign to prevent and treat substance abuse
among Canadians aged fifteen and twenty-four, who constitute 60% of
292. NANCY POOLE, B.C. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH, & COLEEN ANNE
DELL, CANADIAN CTR. ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE, GIRLS, WOMEN AND SUBSTANCE USE
10 (2005).
293. Id. at 9.
294. Id. at 6, 9.
295. Id. at 7; see also Chasnoff et al., supra note 13, at 1202, 1204 (presenting data that in
Pinellas County, Florida, black women are approximately ten times more likely than
white women to be reported to health authorities for substance abuse during preg-
nancy, despite a roughly equivalent frequency of positive results on toxicologic testing
for substance abuse).
296. POOLE & DELL, supra note 292, at 10.
297. Id. at 7; Rodgers, supra note 291, at 723 (citing Soc'Y OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNE-
COLOGISTS OF CAN., HEALTHY BEGINNINGS: GUIDELINES FOR CARE DURING
PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH, No. 18 (1995) ("The literature regarding abuse dur-
ing pregnancy reveals that one in twelve women are victims of violence. In Canada,
forty percent of wife assaults begin during the time of the woman's first preg-
nancy.")); see also Sheilah Martin & Murray Coleman, Judicial Intervention in
Pregnancy, 40 McGILL L.J. 947, 957-58 n.39 (1995) (discussing the cases Superin-
tendent of Family & Child Service v. M.(B.), [1982] 135 D.L.R. (3d) 330 (B.C. Sup.
Ct.), and Re Children's Aid Society for the District of Kenora &JL., [1981] 134 D.L.
R. (3d) 249 (Ont. Prov. Ct.), in which the courts considering whether newborns
should be removed from their mothers due to the mothers' drug use while pregnant
noted that the women in question were the victims of male violence); Erin Nelson,
Reconceiving Pregnancy: Expressive Choice and Legal Reasoning, 49 McGILL L.J. 593,
623-24 (2004).
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illicit drug users, focusing on prevention rather than incarceration as its
primary tool. 
298
C. Social and Economic Support for Children and Their Families
Canada provides pregnant women and new parents with economic
supports that permit them to be at home with a new child for a maxi-
mum of sixty-five weeks.9  Qualifying individuals can receive up to
fifteen weeks of sickness benefits, fifteen weeks of maternity benefits,
and thirty-five weeks of parental benefits. 00 The benefits are available to
all salaried and wage-earning workers, and the parental leave can be
shared by parents, providing greater flexibility in childcare and job and
career planning.0'° These benefits reimburse 55% of a worker's earnings
up to a maximum of Can$22,620 per year, thus providing a greater rela-
tive benefit to low- and middle-income workers.0 2 Parents who return
to work while still receiving maternity or sickness benefits will have their
benefits reduced "dollar for dollar" by the amount they earn, but parents
may retain a portion of parental benefits even if they return to work.03
298. CANADIAN CTR. ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE, A DRUG PREVENTION STRATEGY FOR
CANADA'S YOUTH (2007), available at http://www.ccsa.ca/2007%20CCSA%20
Documents/ccsa-011522-2007-e.pdf.
299. Service Canada, Employment Insurance (EI) and Maternity, Parental and Sickness
Benefits, http://wwwl.servicecanada.gc.ca/en/ei/types/special.shtml (last visited Jan.
27, 2009) (including sickness benefits); see also Associated Press, US. Stands Apart
from Other Nations on Maternity Leave, USA TODAY, July 26, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-07-26-maternity-leavex.htm (compar-
ing the benefits received by American workers with their counterparts in Canada and
other developed nations).
300. Service Canada, supra note 299. To qualify, the individual must have worked at least
six hundred hours during the last fifty-two weeks. Id. In addition, to qualify for ma-
ternity benefits, the individual must have been pregnant. Id. Parental benefits are for
a couple, to be shared among the two parents as they elect. Id.
301. Id.; see also Linda A. White, Institutions, Constitutions, Actor Strategies, and Ideas:
Explaining Variations in Paid Parental Leave Policies in Canada and the United States,
4 INT'L J. CONST'L L. 319, 323-25 (2006).
302. Service Canada, supra note 299. An additional Family Supplement is given to low-
income families (those earning below Can$25,921) and is increased for families who
have children under age seven. Service Canada, Employment Insurance (EI) and the
Family Supplement, available at http://wwwl.servicecanada.gc.ca/en/ei/service/
family-supplement.shtml (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
303. Service Canada, supra note 299.
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V. FRENCH APPROACHES TO FETAL PROTECTION AND CHILD HEALTH
A. The Legal Framework
The French position on fetal protection might best be described as
one of supporting the potential for new human life represented by preg-
nancy, but not treating either embryos or fetuses as fully human,
drawing a bright line at birth. Thus, French law promotes the birth of
children through state-regulated and state-funded assisted reproductive
technology, as well as significant economic support to encourage French
citizens to have larger families. France provides universal healthcare to
children and adults, and French law mandates generous maternity leaves
and other benefits to defray the costs of having more children. It also
limits pregnant women's ability to work in hazardous conditions. At the
same time, French law appears to respect women's rights to control their
bodies and the healthcare they receive. This is evidenced by the declara-
tion of the National Consultative Committee of Ethics' °4 that
intervention in a pregnant woman's right to refuse medical treatment
should rarely be overridden, and through the availability of government-
funded abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.
As in Canada, a unified judicial system and a strong national Par-
liament establish a uniform system of laws throughout the country. The
highest French court, la Cour de Cassation, °5 has recognized a civil
cause of action against third parties for harm caused prior to birth by
medical malpractice, but Parliament has effectively overturned this deci-
sion by limiting the relief available in such cases and providing that the
compensation is for the parents of the injured child for their losses,
304. La Comit6 Consultatif National d'Ethique (CCNE) is an appointed body which is
consulted by the president or a government minister for its recommendations on bio-
ethical issues, which then form the basis for legislative action. See Law No. 94-654 of
July 29, 1994, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Franqaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of
France], July 30, 1994, p. 11060, 11067; Decree No. 97-555 of May 29, 1997,
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechTexte.do (last visited Nov. 20,
2008).
305. The Cour de Cassation is the main court of last resort in France on civil, criminal,
social and commercial matters; it deals with appeals (called "pourvoi en cassation")
taken from the Courts of Appeals ("Cours d'Appel"). See Cour de Cassation: About
the Court, http://www.courdecassation.fr/about the court_9256.html (last visited
Jan. 27, 2009). Cases against the state or local authorities are decided by the
"Tribunaux Administratifs" and appealed to the "Conseil d'ltat," the court of last re-
sort for those cases. See Le Conseil d'tat en bref, http://www.conseil-
etat.fr/ce/missio/index mi ceOl.shtml (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
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rather than directed to the child itself °6 Most significantly, in homicide
cases French law has consistently recognized birth as a bright line. The
Cour de Cassation has held repeatedly that, because a fetus is not a per-
son, no homicide charges may be brought against a party who causes the
death of a fetus, whether the defendant is a doctor or another third
party, such as a drunk driver.107 No French woman has ever been crimi-
nally prosecuted for conduct causing harm or death to her fetus, nor has
any French woman been civilly committed as a means of preventing
harm to her fetus, even though there is rising concern that alcohol con-
sumption by pregnant French women is putting children at risk.08
1. The Criminal Law
In three cases decided in the last eight years, the Cour de Cassation
has held that a fetus is not a "juridical person," and thus one who causes
the death of a fetus cannot be prosecuted for homicide.0 9 Two cases
arose out of medical malpractice, while the other involved fetal death as
a result of a motor vehicle accident.
306. See infra text accompanying notes 331-339.
307. See discussion infra Part V.A. 1.
308. See Didier Mennecier, Alcool et Grossesse, LES M9DECINS MAITREs-ToILE, Mar. 12,
2005, http://www.mmt-fr.org/articlel83.html (citing, inter alia, the French Gov-
ernment's Enquite nationale pirinatale 1998 [National Prenatal Survey 1998],
available at http://www.sante.gouv.fr/htm/dossiers/perinat/somm2.htm). Estimates
of the number of children born in France affected by fetal alcohol syndrome range
between 1.3 and 3.5 per 1,000 infants. Id.
309. A striking transatlantic comparison of this difference between French and American
law was brought home by the French prosecution of Thierry Gaitaud, a dual French-
American citizen, charged with murdering his pregnant American wife in San Diego.
See Ren&e Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for an
American Murder in the French Cour DAssises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 793 (2001).
Under its extradition treaty with the United States, France is expressly permitted to
refuse to extradite French citizens, who may choose to be tried in France for crimes
committed extraterritorially. France has exhibited reluctance to extradite those facing
the death penalty, as Thierry would have in California. Id. at 793-94. Gaitaud hav-
ing fled the U.S. prior to his arrest in France, France elected to exercise its broad
jurisdictional power and try Gaitaud in France. Id. During the trial the judge ob-
served that the fetus was viable, describing "the little baby in Susan's womb, who was
only about fifteen days from being born-the baby who would have been your son.
I've seen pictures of the fetus, and it was a real baby, with hands and fingers .... Id.
at 793. Yet there was never a suggestion that Gaitaud could be charged with the fetus'
homicide under French law.
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The Vo case,3"' which attracted the most attention, involved a phy-
sician's mistaken identification of a patient, which led him to commit
malpractice. Two women of Vietnamese ancestry, both surnamed Vo,
were patients at the same hospital. 11 One patient was six months preg-
nant, and the other patient was seeking removal of her IUD.3 2 The
defendant physician called out to the waiting room for Madame Vo, and
the pregnant patient responded 3  Without any preliminary physical
examination, the physician attempted to remove the IUD he believed
the woman was carrying.31 4 Instead, he ruptured the amniotic sac sur-
rounding the fetus, ultimately causing its demise at the age of twenty to
twenty-one weeks." 5 Apparently because of the difficulties of bringing a
medical malpractice case in France, 16 Madame Vo instead sought a
criminal prosecution, and the physician was charged with unintentional
homicide.3 7 After a complicated procedural history, the case reached the
310. N.B. French criminal cases are generally not cited by the names of the defendants,
but by their decision numbers and dates.
311. Vo v. France (No. 53924/00), I 10-11, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Cham-
ber), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.inttkp1 97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en.
312. Vo (No. 53924/00) 1110-11.
313. Vo (No. 53924/00) 11.
314. Vo (No. 53924/00)91 11.
315. Vo (No. 53924/00) 191 11-12, 14.
316. For many years, it was necessary in practice for one seeking to win tort damages for
medical malpractice to first successfully prosecute a criminal action. E-mail from
Marc A. Rodwin, Professor of Law, Suffolk Univ. Law Sch., to author (Apr. 5,
2008). In addition, other difficulties in bringing malpractice actions include prob-
lems in suing physicians, many of whom are state employees, and the prolonged
nature of malpractice litigation. The latter problem is exemplified by the case of
Nicholas Perruche, whose case took fourteen years to progress through French courts.
See infra text accompanying notes 332-334.
317. Vo (No. 53924/00) 1 17-18. This is the term used to describe the crime of"homi-
cide involontaire," CODE P9NAL [C. P9N] art. 319 (Fr.), translated in Vo (No.
53924/00) 1 23 ("Anyone who through his or her inadvertence, negligent act, inat-
tention, negligent omission or breach of regulation unintentionally commits
homicide or unintentionally causes death, shall be liable to imprisonment of between
three months and two years and a fine of between 1,000 and 30,000 francs."), under
which the defendant was prosecuted. Through a reorganization of the Penal Code,
this crime is now prosecuted under Article 221-6, see Vo (No. 53924/00) 124, which
provides that "[clausing the death of another person by clumsiness, rashness, inatten-
tion, negligence or breach of an obligation of safety or prudence imposed by statute
or regulations ... constitutes manslaughter punished by three years' imprisonment
and a fine of C45,000." C. P9N. art. 221-6, translated at Legifrance.gouv.fr,
http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=33&r=3686 (last visited Jan. 27,
2009). For purposes of consistency, I will use the term unintentional homicide
throughout this section.
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Cour de Cassaion."' That court noted the scientific uncertainty sur-
rounding the precise moment at which a zygote becomes an embryo, an
embryo becomes a fetus, and a fetus becomes viable, and declared that
this uncertain and contingent status precluded it from upholding a
homicide conviction in light of the principle that penal laws are to be
strictly construed.319
The European Court of Human Rights upheld the decision of the
Cour de Cassation against an appeal brought by Madame Vo. She al-
leged that the failure of French law to recognize a fetus as a person
violated Article II of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which provides that "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law."'32
The European Court of Human Rights rejected the challenge, holding
that because France provided adequate administrative remedies for the
physician's malpractice, it was unnecessary to impose a criminal sanction
for the unintentional killing.321 Significantly, the court found that in
view of the diversity of viewpoints among European member states
about the legitimacy of abortion, the question of when life begins, and
whether a fetus was a "person," ". it would be inappropriate to impose
one exclusive moral code.' ,322
In two opinions rendered after its decision in the Vo case, the Cour
de cassation reiterated its view that birth was essential to a homicide
prosecution. The first, the Potonet case, also involved medical malprac-
tice. A midwife and physician were charged with unintentional
homicide based on allegations that they failed to act swiftly enough after
a pregnant woman (Madame Potonet) alerted them to the irregular
heartbeat of her fetus during a difficult labor; subsequently, the fetus
318. The Lyons Criminal Court acquitted the physician doctor on the ground that the
fetus was not a person, and the case was appealed. See Vo (No. 53924/00) R 19-20.
The Lyons Court of Appeal reversed the lower court judgment, holding that the doc-
tor was guilty of unintentional homicide and imposing a heavy fine and a suspended
six month prison sentence. See id. 91 21. The physician then appealed. See id. 91 22.
319. See Vo (No. 53924/00) 21; see also Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle [Cass.
crim.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction, criminal chamber], Jun. 30, 1999, Bull.
crim., No. 174, p. 511 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
initRechJuriJudi.do (search "Numdro d'affaire" for "97-8235 1").
320. Vo (No. 53924/00) 1 46 (quoting Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5).
321. Vo (No. 53924/00) 1191-95. Notably absent from the opinion of either the Cour
de Cassation or the European Court of Human Rights was any meaningful discussion
of the circumstances under which Madame Vo experienced negligent treatment from
a physician, or the racism or language barrier that could have precipitated this inci-
dent. Why, for example, did the treating physician not ask Madame Vo why she was
visiting him, rather than immediately reaching into her uterus?
322. Vo (No. 53924/00) 11 82, 87-95.
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had been stillborn. The Cour de cassation declared explicitly that no
conviction for involuntary manslaughter was possible because a fetus
becomes a human person only after birth. 23
The Cour de cassation also took this view in a case involving the
death of a fetus as a result of harm to a pregnant woman as the result of
a motor vehicle accident. In the Grosmangin case, in which a driver in-
jured a pregnant woman and caused the death of her six-month-old
fetus, the Court upheld the driver's conviction for involuntary harm to
the woman, but ruled that he could not be convicted of involuntary
manslaughter of the fetus. The Court held that the principle of "legality
of offenses and punishments which requires a strict interpretation of
penal law precludes the extension of the law on unintentional homicide
to the child to be born, whose legal status is enshrined in particular texts
dealing with embryos and fetuses. 3 24 The Grosmangin decision was fol-
lowed in a subsequent lower court case involving an automobile
accident in which both the pregnant woman and her fetus were killed.
2 1
French law also makes it a crime punishable by five years impris-
onment and a fine of C75,000 to terminate a pregnancy without the
woman's consent. 26 Until recently it was a lesser crime to terminate
pregnancy past the legal time limit for abortion,327 or when the one ter-
minating the pregnancy was not a physician, or when the procedure was
not performed in an approved hospital, but these crimes were repealed
in 2001.328 However, since abortion became legal in 1975,329 no French
323. Cass. crim., June 25, 2002, Bull. crim., No. 144, p. 531, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechJuriJudi.do (search "Numdro d'affaire" for
"00-81359") ("[I]l ne peut y avoir d'homicide involontaire du foetus, celui-ci ne de-
venant une personne humaine qu'apr~s la naissance.").
324. Grosmangin case, Cour de cassation, Assemblde pldni&e [Cass. ass. pldn.], June 29,
2001, Bull. ass. pldn., No. 8, p. 19, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
initRechJuriJudi.do (search "Numdro d'affaire" for "99-85973") (declaring "le prin-
cipe de la ldgalitd des ddlits et des peines, qui impose une interprdtation stricte de la
loi pdnale, s'oppose ce que l'incrimination prdvue par rarticle 221-6 du Code pdnal,
rdprimant l'homicide involontaire d'autrui, soit dtendue au cas de renfant . naitre
dont le rdgime juridique relke de textes particuliers sur l'embryon ou le fcetus.")
325. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Metz, Feb. 17, 2005, No. 05/222.
326. C. PN. art. 223-10. This article, and the others discussed in this paragraph, are in a
section of the Penal Code separate from the one addressing "Offenses Against the Life
of Persons," C. P9N. arts. 221-1 to -10.
327. French abortion law is discussed infra, Part V.A.3.
328. C. P9N. art. 223-11, repealed by Law No. 2001-588 of July 4, 2001, art. 14, J.O.,
July 7, 2001, p. 10823.
329. Abortion was made legal on January 17, 1975, by the Law Veil, Law No. 75-17,
J.O., Jan. 18, 1975, p. 739, authorizing abortion at any time up to ten weeks when
the pregnant woman was in a "situation of distress," id. at tit. II, § 1. Critics of the
law objected to its seven day waiting period, and the requirement that women un-
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woman has ever been criminally charged for causing harm to her fe-
330
tus.
2. Tort Liability and Medical Decisionmaking
French courts and Parliament have recognized limited rights to sue
for damages caused by negligence that affected the fetus in utero. In the
landmark Nicolas Perruche case,331 the Cour de cassation affirmed the
award of damages of C900,000 (about $1.32 million in current U.S.
dollars) to the parents of a child born with severe birth defects due to his
mother's contracting rubella while pregnant, based on the clear causal
connection between the physician's negligence in failing to accurately
advise the mother about inconsistent laboratory tests about her rubella
status and the harm suffered.332 Madame Perruche had told her physi-
cian that she might have been exposed to rubella, and informed him
that she would have an abortion if there was a risk that she would give
birth to a disabled child. However, due to the physician's negligence,
the mother was not accurately informed about the test results, which
showed that she had in fact contracted rubella.334
Both the Parliament and the National Consultative Ethics Com-
mittee for Health and Life Sciences (CCNE) responded strongly to the
dergo a psychological interview prior to receiving an abortion. Although the 1975 law
had a "sunset provision" of five years, it was renewed with minor changes in 1979.
Law No. 79-1204 of Dec. 31, 1979, J.O., Jan. 1, 1980, p. 3, available at
http:llcyber.law.harvard.edu/population/abortion/France.abo.htm (last visited Nov.
20, 2008).
330. Before the Law Neurwith of 1967, which authorized the disclosure of information on
contraceptive means, and the Law Veil of 1975, the repressive Law of 1920 forbade
any disclosure of information on contraceptive means. Despite allowing an exception
for therapeutic abortion where the mother's life was in danger, a 1939 abortion law
extended punishment to women attempting to procure an abortion, and a Vichy-era
law imposed the death penalty on those who performed abortions. See PETER DE
CRUZ, COMPARATIVE HEALTHCARE LAw 436-38 (2001); MIRANDA POLLARD, REIGN
OF VIRTUE: MOBILIZING GENDER IN VICHY FRANCE 179-80 (1998); Marcel Viaud,
La libre disposition de son corps, 7 MFRACTIONS (1998-99), as reprinted at
hrtp://www.plusloin.org/refractions/refractions7/corps.viaud.htm. The most famous
person executed for this crime was Marie-Louise Giraud, a laundress from Cher-
bourg, who was convicted of having carried out twenty-seven abortions and was
guillotined in the yard of La Roquette prison in Paris. POLLARD, supra, at 179-80;
Viaud, supra.
331. Cass. ass. pldn., Nov. 17, 2000, Bull. ass. pldn., No. 9, p. 15.
332. R. Clement & 0. Rodat, Post-Perruche: What Responsibilities for Professionals?, 25
MED. & LAw 31, 33 (2006) (summarizing the Perruche decision).
333. Id.
334. Id.
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Perruche decision. The CCNE issued an opinion expressing its concerns
about the decision's legal and ethical consequences.335 On March 4,
2002, Parliament also responded, enacting a statute "governing patients'
rights and the quality of the health system." 336 The law provides that
children do not have a right not to be born, and that a child cannot be
awarded damages for wrongful birth due to a failure to diagnose a con-
dition for which the mother might have chosen abortion. 37 The law
permits suits by the parents to go forward in cases of extreme physician
fault, but the damages which can be awarded are limited to "moral dam-
ages."" The law was given retroactive effect. Its retroactive application,
however, was found to violate Article 34 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights. 39
Pregnant women's ability to control their bodies and their health-
care is generally protected by law and the medical community, although
335. The Minister for Employment and Solidarity particularly requested the National
Consultative Ethics Committee's opinion on three points: the place in society of
handicapped adults and children; the intrinsic value of a handicapped life as related
to non-birth; and good medical practices entailing liability on the part of prenatal di-
agnosis practitioners. CCNE, Avis No. 68, HANDICAPS COGNITAUX ET PREJUDICE
[CONGENITAL HANDICAPS AND PREJUDICE] (2001), http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/docs/
fr/avis068.pdf [http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/docs/en/avis068.pdf.
336. Law No. 2002-303 of March 4, 2002, J.O., March 5, 2002, p. 4 1 1 8 ("loi ... relative
aux droits des malades et la qualit6 du syst~me de sant6") (translated as "the law re-
lating to patients' rights and the quality of the health system").
337. Id. (codified at CODE DE L'ACTION SOCIALE ET DES FAMILLES Ll 14-5 by Law No.
2005-102 of Feb. 11, 2005, J.O., Feb. 12, 2005, p. 2353) ("Nul ne peut se prdvaloir
d'un prdjudice du seul fait de sa naissance. La personne ne avec un handicap d(I
une faute mddicale peut obtenir la reparation de son prejudice lorsque l'acte fautif a
provoqu6 directement le handicap ou 'a aggrav6, ou n'a pas permis de prendre les
mesures susceptibles de l'attdnuer. Lorsque la responsabilit6 d'un professionnel ou
d'un 6tablissement de santd est engag~e vis- -vis des parents d'un enfant n6 avec un
handicap non ddceld pendant la grossesse la suite d'une faute caractdrisde, les parents
peuvent demander une indemnitd au titre de leur seul prejudice. Ce prejudice ne sau-
rait inclure les charges particuli res dcoulant, tout au long de la vie de l'enfant, de ce
handicap. La compensation de ce dernier relve de la solidarit6 nationale.").
338. See id.; Assistance Publique Hdpitaux de Paris cILpoux M, Cour administrative d'appel
[CAA] [regional court of administrative appeal] Paris (3e ch.), June 13, 2002, D.
2002, 2156, note de Montecler. But see Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative
court], Feb. 19, 2003, J.C.P. 2003, II, 10107, note Mistretta (awarding, on appeal of
the appellate court decision, additional damages arguably beyond the ordinary legal
scope of moral damages).
339. Maurice v. France (No. 11810/03), Tiff 10-11, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand
Chamber), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en.
After this judgment was rendered, the parties reached a negotiated settlement on the
amount of damages. See also Sandrine Blanchard, La justice suspend sa dicision dans
une demande de riparation pour un enfant ni handicapi, LE MONDE (Paris), May 20,
2005, available at LEXIS.
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women's rights are occasionally overridden. In 2002 an administrative
tribunal in Lille affirmed a patient's right to make decisions about her
healthcare even though pregnant when it issued an injunction prohibit-
ing a hospital from performing a blood transfusion on a pregnant
Jehovah's Witness over the patient's objection. 4 ° On the other hand, in
2005 the CCNE issued an opinion stating that physicians could over-
ride a pregnant woman's refusal of treatment in exceptional situations,
including C-sections and blood transfusions, which occur with some
frequency in the case of women giving birth by C-section.341 The opinion
noted the difficulty of such cases, in light of the woman's religious beliefs,
cultural community, and the risk that a woman who had a C-section in
France might find it more difficult to have a subsequent C-section in her
home country, but the CCNE concluded that it was permissible to over-
ride the woman's wishes in order to save the life of the child about to be
born. 342 The opinion suggested, however, that many of these cases could
be avoided if physicians anticipated such problems and discussed them
with patients well before an emergency arose. 43 The opinion urged
340. Tribunal Administratif [Trib. adm. Lille] [regional administrative court of first ins-
tance] Lille, Aug. 25, 2002, No. 02-3138. In so ruling, the court relied on Article
Li 111-4 of the Public Health Code, which provides, inter alia,
In the light of information and advice supplied by healthcarers [sic] and in
consultation with them, patients are entitled to take decisions regarding
their own health. Doctors must respect wishes expressed by patients after
informing them of the consequences of their decisions. When refusing to
undergo or continue treatment represents a threat to life, physicians must
do their utmost to convince patients that they should accept essential
treatment. No medical act nor [sic] any treatment may be applied without
securing free and informed consent from the person concerned. Consent
may withdrawn at any time.
CODE DE LA SANT9 PUBLIQUE art. LI 111-4, translated in CCNE, Avis No. 87, REFUs
DE TRAITEMENT ET AUTONOMIE DE LA PERSONNE [TREATMENT REFUSAL AND PERSO-
NAL AUTONOMY] 16 (2005), http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/docs/fr/avis087.pdf
[http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/docs/en/avis087.pdf]. The French text reads:
Toute personne prend, avec le professionnel de sant6, compte tenu des in-
formations et des prconisations qu'il lui fournit, les ddcisions concernant
sa sant6. Le mddecin doit respecter la volont6 de la personne apr~s l'avoir
inform6e des cons6quences de son choix. Si la volont6 de la personne de re-
fuser ou d'interrompre un traitement met sa vie en danger, le mddecin doit
tout mettre en oeuvre pour la convaincre d'accepter les soins indispensa-
bles. Aucun acte mddical ni aucun traitement ne peut 8tre pratiqu6 sans le
consentement libre et 6clair6 de la personne et ce consentement peut ktre
retir6 tout moment.
Id.
341. CCNE Avis No. 87, supra note 340, at 6-7.
342. See id.
343. Id. at 7.
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physicians to endeavor to work through the issue with the patient in an
atmosphere of trust, relying on second opinions and mediation to en-
sure a continuing dialogue with the patient.344 In contrast to its
approach to C-sections and blood transfusions, the opinion declared
that pregnant women who were HIV positive could not be forced to
receive treatment to decrease the risk that their children would also be
born with HIV.45 Importantly, the opinion declared that the legal and
ethical dilemma posed by patients' refusal of treatment could not be
solved by a reflexive application of the French legal obligation to "assist a
person in danger."
346
3. Abortion Law
Abortion has been legal in France since 1975, and access to abor-
tion was expanded in 2001.3 Currently, French women can obtain an
abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy if they are in "a state
of distress" and wait at least seven days after their first request for an
abortion. 48 Abortions may also be performed in the second trimester if
two physicians and a psychologist or social worker certify that the con-
tinued pregnancy poses a risk to the life or health of the pregnant
woman or there is a risk of fetal malformation or genetic defect.
49
344. Id. at 27-28.
345. Id. at 11.
346. C. P9N. art. 223-6 states,
[A] nybody who is able, without risk to himself or to a third party, to avoid
either a crime or an offense against the bodily integrity of a person and
who abstains from doing so will be punished to the same sentence as for
the crime of a person who voluntarily abstains from securing someone.
In French, the Code reads:
Quiconque pouvant emp&her par son action immddiate, sans risque pour
lui ou pour les tiers, soit un fait qualifi6 de crime, soit un ddlit contre
l'int6grit6 corporelle de la personne s'abstient volontairement de le
faire.... [s]era puni des mmes peines quiconque s'abstient volontaire-
ment de porter une personne en p~ril l'assistance que sans risque pour lui
ni pour les tiers il pouvait lui prater, soit par son action personnelle soit en
provocant un secours.
Id.
347. Law No. 2001-588 of July 4, 2001, J.O., July 7, 2001, p. 10823 ("loi relative
l'interruption volontaire de grossesse et la contraception" [law governing the volun-
tary interruption of pregnancy and contraception]).
348. The 2001 amendments to the law eliminated the requirement of a psychological
interview. Id.
349. Id. art. 11, at p. 10824. An abortion may be performed at "any time if two doctors of
a multidisciplinary team testify that the continuance of the pregnancy will put the
[Vol. 15:389
PURSUING THE PERFECT MOTHER
Minors are authorized to receive an abortion without parental consent if
they are accompanied by another adult;35° indeed, on "Free Wednesday"
when French schools are closed in the afternoon, clinics are open to
teenagers to provide them with contraceptive advice and services.3" The
national health system includes abortion as a covered procedure, with
women paying about 20% of the cost, although minors and poor
women receive free abortions.352 In practice, women must often wait
three to four weeks to have an abortion. In the Paris region two-thirds of
abortions are performed at public hospitals because of the dearth of pri-
vate physicians who perform the procedure. 53
woman's health in danger or that there is a strong probability that the child to be
born is affected by a particularly serious disease known to be incurable." The French
text reads:
L'interruption volontaire d'une grossesse peut, toute 6poque, 6tre prati-
qude si deux mddecins membres d'une 6quipe pluridisciplinaire attestent,
apr~s que cette 6quipe a rendu son avis consultatif, soit que la poursuite de
la grossesse met en pdril grave la sant6 de la femme, soit qu'il existe une
forte probabilitd que l'enfant a naitre soit atteint d'une affection d'une par-
ticuli~re gravit6 reconnue comme incurable au moment du diagnostic.
Id.
350. Id. art. 7, at p. 10823. However, under the law physicians are obliged to try to obtain
the minor's consent to consult her parents. See id.; F. Vendittelli & J.C. Pons, Elec-
tive Abortion for Minors: Impact of the New Law in France, 130 EUR. J. OBSTET. &
GYNECOL. & REPROD. BIOL. 107, 111 (2007) (arguing that "[r]ecourse to non-
parental adults was intended to be reserved for exceptional circumstances"). Some
physicians may refuse to perform abortions for minors without their parents' consent,
under the law's conscientious objection provision. Law No. 2001-588 of July 4,
2001, art. 8, at p. 10823.
351. LINDA BERNE & BARBARA HUBERMAN, ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, EUROPEAN AP-
PROACHES TO ADOLESCENT SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND RESPONSIBILITY 11 (1999),
http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/PUBLICATIONS/european-es.pdf.
352. Service-Public.Fr, Vos Droits et Ddmarches: Santd: Interruption Volontaire de
Grossesse (IVG) (Apr. 23, 2008), http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/
F1551.xhtml. Currently a surgical abortion, if performed at a public or private non-
profit institution, costs roughly between _228 and C330 (depending on use of general
anesthesia and length of hospitalization), and a medical abortion costs about t257 or
E 192 (depending on the healthcare provider). Id.
353. See Jean-Michel Bader, France: Call for Change in Regulations on Abortion Clinics, 341
LANCET 485, 486 (1993).
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B. Healthcare Access
France has a universal healthcare system... in which all legal resi-
dents are entitled to receive treatment, although there are variations in
the extent to which this care will be reimbursed by the government."'
Further, coverage varies according to the longevity and status of one's
employment, so that more highly paid workers who have had their jobs
for several years are more likely to have most of their healthcare expendi-
tures reimbursed. 56 For ambulatory care, people are expected to pay for
the care when it is given and then are reimbursed for it, with different
percentages of reimbursement depending on the type of care given (e.g.,
emergency room treatment, out-patient office visits, and prescription
medications)."' The system is generally considered to deliver high-
quality care, although its high costs, for both the state and patients, have
lead to calls for modification."' In 2004, the government tightened eli-
gibility criteria for accessing the national healthcare system, excluding
immigrants who have recently arrived in France. 9
In the last several years, both government and private actors have
attempted to reduce the incidence of fetal alcohol syndrome and other
harmful effects of exposure to alcohol in utero.360 The problem appears
particularly pronounced in poor industrial areas, receiving attention in
354. Jason J. Kilborn, Comparative Cause and Effect: Consumer Insolvency and the Eroding
Social Safety Net, 14 COL. J. EUR. L. 563, 571 (2008) ("Though not completely uni-
versal until 2000, 95% of the population of France has been covered by one of the
three basic state health insurance schemes since the 1980s"); Elaine Sciolino, France
Battles a Problem That Grows and Grows: Fat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/25/international/europe/25obese.html.
355. Kilborn, supra note 354, at 571-72, 594.
356. See id. at 571-72.
357. Lise Rochaix & David Wilsford, State Autonomy, Policy Paralysis: Paradoxes of Institu-
tions and Culture in the French Health Care System, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 97,
99 (2005); Victor G. Rodwin & Claude Le Pen, Healthcare Reform in France-The
Birth of State-Led Managed Care, 351 N.E. J. MED. 2259, 2260 (2004); see also Kil-
born, supra note 354, at 572.
358. See, e.g., Rochaix & Wilsford, supra note 357, at 98, 108, 115-17; Rodwin & Le
Pen, supra note 357, at 2259, 2261.
359. Medicins sans Frontieres [Doctors Without Borders], France: Helping Undocu-
mented Residents (May 12, 2005), available at http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/
invoke.cfm?objectid=F7F24938-E0 18-0C72-09773A35FE3334B3&component=
toolkit.article&method=fullhtml.
360. Consumer groups and doctors have urged the government to provide warning labels
on wine bottles, although the warning sign "is no bigger than the head of a pencil
eraser." Molly Moore, New Health Warning on Wine Labels Has Many French Seeing
Red, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2007, at A9. It has been estimated that about 3,000
French infants suffer from fetal alcohol syndrome each year. Id.
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Roubaix, northeast of Lille in northern France. In 2004, the public
prosecutor in Lille launched a criminal investigation against wine pro-
ducers and the French government into the damage caused by in utero
alcohol exposure, with potential charges of putting another's life at risk,
161
attempting to mislead consumers, and unintentionally causing injury.
Perhaps in response, in 2005 the Parliament enacted a law that requires
all wine sold in France to carry a warning against drinking by pregnant
women. 6 ' The law requires all wine bottles to carry a logo using the
ubiquitous red circle with a line through it encircling a pregnant
364
woman.
C. Social and Economic Supportfor Children and Their Families
France has adopted an extensive economic and social support sys-
tem to encourage parents to have large families. Women are granted
sixteen weeks of fully paid maternity leave for their first child, and
twenty-six weeks for their subsequent children.365 Men are granted
eleven days of paid paternity leave.366 Mothers are entitled to take addi-
tional unpaid leave until the child's third birthday, 67 and women whose
children are very ill or are disabled are able to take additional leave.368
Women and families with two or more children also receive a variety of
economic subsidies, including the Parental Education and Upbringing
361. Cf Jane Burgermeister, News Extra, French Wine Makers Face Legal Action over Birth
Defects, 329 BMJ 368 (2004).
362. Id.
363. Law No. 2005-102 of February 11, 2005, art. 5, J.O., Feb. 12, 2005, p. 2353.
364. See Stephanie Condron, Drink Labels "Should Carry a Warning for Pregnant Women,"
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 10. 2007, at 13, available at 2007 WLNR
2646217 (describing the French label in the context of a British policy debate over
requiring similar warning labels); French Row Over "Wine Warnings," BBC NEWS,
Nov. 25, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2lhi/health/4469390.stm (noting
that the labeling requirement would become effective in 2006).
365. ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEv. (OECD), STARTING STRONG II: EARLY
CHILDHOOD EDUCATION AND CARE 325, 327 (2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/32/37425999.pdf. See generally id. at 325-32 (de-
scribing various French support systems relevant to early childhood education and
care).
366. Id. at 325, 327.
367. Id.
368. CODE DE LA SgCURITI SOCIXLE IC. stC. soC.] [SocIAL SECURITY CODE] arts. R544-1 to
-3 (Fr.); see also Service-Public.Fr, Vos Droits et D~marches: Famille: Allocation
Journali~re de Presence Parentale (AJPP) (Jan. 1, 2009), http:llvosdroits.service-
public.fr/particuliers/F 15132.xhtml?&n=Famille&l=N1O&n=Allocations%20destin%
C3%A9es%20aux%20familles&=N 156.
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Allowance for families with at least three children under age six369 and
subsidized day care for children under age six. 7 Single parents receive
additional support,37' and parents of school-age children also receive a
once a year subsidy to help defray the costs of school books and cloth-
ing."' Other supplements are available for larger families, and some
families are eligible for housing supports. In 2004 this system was
modified, to consolidate and eliminate certain benefits, to be replaced
with a single, virtually universal allowance, called the PAJE. 74
VI. REFLECTIONS ON THE REASONS FOR DIFFERENT TREATMENT
OF THE FETUS IN AMERICAN, CANADIAN, AND FRENCH LAW
My research suggests four major differences in the legal regimens of
the United States, Canada, and France, which help explain their dispa-
rate approaches to "fetal protection." First and foremost is the fact that
Canada and France both have strong national governments, with rela-
tively little power held at the provincial, and departmental, level,
respectively. The second major difference is that in the United States, in
contrast to Canada and France, the right to abortion was established
through litigation rather than legislation. The third significant difference
is that in Canada and France, abortion and other reproductive health-
care are covered services under the national healthcare system. The
fourth fundamental difference is that American prosecutors at the state
level are elected and locally accountable, in contrast to both Canada and
369. C. skc. soc. arts. L532-1 to -5, prior to abrogation by Law No. 2003-1199 of Dec.
18, 2003, art. 60, J.O., Dec. 19, 2003, p. 21641; Service-Public.Fr, Vos Droits et
Ddmarches: Famille: Allocation Parentale d' ducation (APE) (Jan. 1, 2009),
http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/F506.xhtml; see also OECD, supra note
365, at 325, 327.
370. C. sic. soc. arts. L841-1 to -4, R841-1, prior to abrogation by Law No. 2003-1199 of
Dec. 18, 2003, art. 60 and Decree No. 2003-1393 of Dec. 31, 2003, J.O., Jan. 1,
2004, p. 102; see also OECD, supra note 365, at 326-29.
371. C. sc. soc. arts. L524-1 to -4.
372. C. skc. soc. art. L543-1.
373. C. s5C. soc. arts. L831-1 to -7.
374. Law No. 2003-1199 of Dec. 18, 2003, art. 60; see also Service-Public.Fr, supra note
369. For an overview of the comprehensive French system of child supports, see Edward
Cody, With Each French Birth, a Dividendfrom the State; Vast Welfare Support Network
Is an Enduring Government Feature, Even During Financial Downturns, WASH. POST,
Nov.22, 2008, at Al0. An excellent source of information about all French child sup-
ports is the The Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child, Youth and
Family Policies at Columbia University, http://www.childpolicyind.org/countries/
france.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
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France, where prosecutors are appointed and function within a national
criminal justice system.
In addition, the legal system differences must be viewed in the con-
text of important religious and cultural differences among the three
countries. Despite the First Amendment's separation of church and
state, Americans as a group are much more religious, more likely to at-
tend church, and to consider religious issues in making political
decisions than Canadians.3 76 Although France's history as a Catholic na-
tion strongly influenced the development of its law, for nearly a hundred
years France has an official policy of "lacit6," religious secularism. Thus,
although many French are at least nominally Catholic, they appear to be
more tolerant of human frailty, as witnessed by the common appearance
of mistresses, as well as wives, at political notables' funerals,377 or the re-
cent decision of the International Monetary Fund to reprimand, but not
fire, its Director for having an affair with an employee.7
A. The Strength of the National Government
The strength of the national government in Canada and France has
led to a strikingly uniform body of law in the areas of criminal law,
healthcare (including abortion, biotechnology, and other aspects of
medical practice), and tort law, established through their respective na-
tional Parliaments and court systems. This stands in marked contrast to
the United States, in which the federal and state governments are sepa-
rate sovereign governments, with significant independent authority.
Because the United States government is conceptually a government of
limited powers, granted to the federal government by the states via the
375. See discussion infra Part VI.D and sources cited therein.
376. Karen Dorn Steele, Nations Are Old Friends Growing Apart; As U.S. Attitudes Veer
Right, Canadians Head Left, SPoicEsMAN-REv. (Spokane, Wash.), Sept. 5, 2004, at
1A, available at 2004 WLNR 17372747 (citing multiple sources concluding that
Canadians are "shedding their deference to authority, rejecting established churches
and the patriarchal family," while "Americans are becoming more religious, xeno-
phobic and fearful after the 9/11 attacks" and "more inclined to believe in an
afterlife, God and the devil .... inject[ing] religion into political debates in ways that
make Canadians squirm.").
377. E.g., Craig R. Whitney, World Leaders Pay Last Tribute to Mitterrand, HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan. 12, 1996, at A22, available at 1996 WLNR 5923688.
378. Mark Landler, Monetary Fund Won't Fire Director for SexualAffair, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2008, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/26/worldl
26imf.html. While undoubtedly an overstatement, My Fair Lady's Henry Higgins
may have been on to something when he observed, "The French don't care what they
do actually as long as they pronounce it properly." Alan Jay Lerner & Frederick
Loewe, Why Can't the English?, in My FAIR LADY (1956).
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Constitution, federal courts and Congress are reluctant to intrude on
state legislative, judicial, and executive actions, for both practical and
institutional reasons. Indeed, the pluralism of the American federal sys-
tem is often cited as a plus, with states serving as a laboratory for
experimentation. 79
B. The Source ofAbortion Rights
Of course, as we know, the United States Constitution does impose
some important constraints on state actions. However, as the battle over
abortion that has raged for thirty-five years since Roe v. Wade380 demon-
strates, in a legal system in which access to a medical procedure is
determined not only by fifty state legislatures and Congress, but also by
a complex hierarchy of state and federal court judges, there are signifi-
cant opportunities, not to say temptations, for those who oppose
abortion to continue to seek to limit its availability.8
This in turn has shaped the strategy of feminists and other support-
ers of access to abortion. In responding to those who oppose abortion
on "pro-life" grounds, advocates for abortion access have frequently
framed the issue as one of a woman's "choice" to have an abortion or
not."' This rationale has given ammunition to fetal protection propo-
nents, who assert that once a woman has chosen not to have an
abortion, she has implicitly accepted full responsibility for all the conse-quenes o he'' " , .383
quences of her behavior during pregnancy. Yet, as many commentators
have pointed out, this twist on the "choice" rhetoric is flawed, both fac-
tually and as a matter of legal doctrine.'
379. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
380. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
381. Many commentators have noted the significance of the departure of Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor from the Supreme Court and her replacement with Justice Samuel
Alito in leading to a different outcome in the two "partial-birth abortion" cases, Sten-
berg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
See, e.g., Talcott Camp, Remarks at the Brooklyn Journal of Law and Policy Sympo-
sium: The "Partial-Birth Abortion" Ban: Health Care in the Shadow of Criminal
Liability (Mar. 7, 2008).
382. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, Abortion Issues (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.
plannedparenthood.orgissues-actionlabortion-issues-5946.htm.
383. I am grateful to Wendy Parmet for this insight.
384. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 297, at 623-24; Oberman, supra note 181, at 471-76.
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The fact that in the United States a woman's ability to obtain an
abortion was established through constitutional litigation, decided by
nine justices of the Supreme Court, has always made the abortion right
more fragile here. In contrast, in many other developed nations, where
access to abortion was hammered out in a national legislative setting, the
process of political horse-trading has made compromise seem both pos-
sible and reasonable. 85
That the constitutional right to abortion is thus seen as fragile and
tentative, capable of being overturned by the appointment of a different
person to a federal appeals court or the Supreme Court, 86 in turn means
that abortion opponents will seek multiple avenues to undercut women's
ability to control their reproductive lives. These include not only direct
attempts to limit abortion access, but also more indirect efforts to chal-
lenge the analytical framework governing abortion. Thus, statutes and
regulations which recast the fetus as a child,387 interfere with women's
abilities to plan in advance for their healthcare in the event that they
become incompetent,"' or insist that women be told about possible fetal
pain and the stages of fetal development, as well as the criminal prose-
cution of pregnant women addicted to alcohol and other drugs, must all
be seen as a means to undermine abortion by making "unborn" life the
full equivalent of, if not superior to, the mother's life.
385. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 145-57
(1987). Of course, it must be noted that in Canada, the federal law making abortion
a crime was invalidated by its Supreme Court in Regina v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1
S.C.R. 30 (Can.). In that case, it was legislative inaction (which may also have been
achieved by political maneuvering) that led to the current situation in which abortion
is legally available throughout Canada, but nonetheless limited in practice. See discus-
sion supra Part IV.A.3.
386. See, for example, the shift in position of the Supreme Court on so-called partial birth
abortion between its decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), and Gon-
zales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), with the only notable difference being the
departure from the court of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor and their
replacement by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
387. This has been accomplished not only in the creation of the term "partial-birth abor-
tion" by abortion opponents, see, e.g., Carole Joffe & Priscilla J. Smith, Remarks at
the Brooklyn Journal of Law and Policy Symposium: The "Partial-Birth Abortion"
Ban: Health Care in the Shadow of Criminal Liability (Mar. 7, 2008), but also in the
regulations redefining a fetus as a child under SCHIP, see supra text accompanying
notes 164-168, and the text of the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, see supra text ac-
companying notes 172-178.
388. These limitations placed on women's ability to execute Advance Medical Directives
are discussed in text accompanying supra note 184.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 155-160.
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C Universal Healthcare-or Not
The failure of the United States to establish universal, government-
funded healthcare3 90 has significant consequences for the debate over
abortion and "fetal rights." This lack of a national healthcare system,
which would cover abortion and birth control as part of routine health-
care, contributes to a situation in which abortion is not regarded by its
opponents as a medical procedure, which can be chosen or rejected by a
patient as part of a personal decisionmaking process, but as murder. The
situation in the United States contrasts markedly with that of France,
where abortion is a fully covered procedure, available to all women dur-
ing the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, and under certain circumstances
during later stages of pregnancy.391 The United States' lack of universal
healthcare also contrasts with the Canadian approach, in which provid-
ing healthcare to all citizens is accepted as a responsibility of government
on both the federal and provincial levels.392 Abortion is covered as a
medical procedure, and the federal government will reimburse provinces
for providing abortion services. However, as critics have noted, some
provinces "limit their funding to specified procedures which often ren-
der access illusory, result in ... delay or require[] women to leave their
home provinces."' Thus, while the law demands access to abortion as a
medically necessary procedure, in practice provincial government deci-
sions make it much harder for poor, rural, and northern Canadian
women to obtain a safe and timely legal abortion.394
390. A complete description of the U.S. healthcare system is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. However, as most readers know, healthcare in the United States is closely linked
to employment. Medicaid, the state-federal partnership making some healthcare
available to very low-income persons, does not require participating states to fund
abortion, and only a handful do. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (up-
holding the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which precludes federal
Medicaid funding for many types of medically necessary abortion, and ruling that
states are not obligated to fund abortions for which the Hyde Amendment denies
federal funding).
391. See supra notes 347-353 and accompanying text. Though abortion is available, the
extent to which the government pays for it depends on the patient's income level, as
is the case with other medical procedures. See supra note 352.
392. See DEBORAH J. CHOLLET, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HEALTH CARE FINANCING IN SE-
LECTED INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND COMMENT (1993),
as excerpted in HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 1136 (Mark A. Hall, Mary Ann Bo-
binski & David Orentlicher eds., 7th ed. 2007).
393. Rodgers, supra note 282, at 115.
394. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 282-289.
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D. Different Prosecutorial Systems
Finally, the local and politicized system through which American
prosecutors are chosen differs sharply different from the more national
and professional prosecutorial systems of Canada and France, and con-
tributes to the emotional pitch of the "fetal protection" wars. The
distinct prosecutorial systems of each nation are a product of both dif-
ferent histories and different philosophies of government.
The local, politically accountable American prosecutor was an early
innovation in the original thirteen colonies. In Great Britain, a system of
private prosecution developed in the Middle Ages and continued
through the late nineteenth century, although Crown prosecutors were
appointed by the central government (the King) in important cases.9 In
contrast, in the American colonies prosecutors were appointed by local
colonial authorities.396 This made sense, as the colonies were isolated and
struggling small settlements, which were often located at great distances
not only from Great Britain but from other outposts of British rule, and
the colonists were living on the edge of survival. 97 The colonies' cultural
norms varied tremendously based on their founders, with religious or-
thodoxy featuring prominently in several of the colonies.9 8 Over time,
the phenomenon of locally appointed prosecutors evolved into positive
law, with Connecticut leading the way in 1704 by establishing a system
of county prosecutors throughout the colony.399 After the American
Revolution, the states continued the system of local prosecutors, who
acted largely independently within their finite geographic realms. 00 Al-
though laws were enacted at the state (and federal) level, as the nation
moved westward and new communities were established along the fron-
tier, these communities' geographic (and sometimes cultural) isolation
meant that local prosecutors were seen as best suited to enforce the crimi-1 40,
nal law. In the wake of the Jacksonian democracy movement which
swept across the United States beginning in the 1820s, prosecutors
395. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 21
(1993); JOAN A. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR xv, 8-9 (1980).
396. See JACOBY, supra note 395, at 5, 15.
397. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 395, at 23; JACOBY, supra note 395, at 11.
398. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 395, at 23-24 (discussing how the different religious cul-
tures of New England, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania influenced the colonial
systems).
399. See JACOBY, supra note 395, at 10.
400. See id. at 20-21.
401. See id. at 16-17, 20-21.
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became elected, rather than appointed, officials. °2 This practice contin-
ues to the present, with forty-five of the fifty states electing prosecutors
on the local level.
In contrast, the Canadian system of prosecution continued to fol-
low the British model even after Canada gained independence from
Great Britain in 1867. Consistently with the development of a national
uniform Criminal Code,04 prosecutors at both the provincial and fed-
eral level initiate criminal proceedings for violations of that Code,
although there is a division of authority depending on the crime's sub-
ject matter. Generally speaking, provincial Attorneys General and their
deputies initiate criminal proceedings at the provincial level for viola-
tions of federal offenses which are not in the Criminal Code (such as
environmental and other regulatory crimes), as well as for violations of
most provisions of the Criminal Code. However, prosecutions of some
provisions of the Criminal Code are reserved for the federal government,
including tax offenses, elections offenses, drug crimes, money launder-
ing, organized crime, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.0 5
Federal prosecutors are located in regional and national offices, and their
work is sometimes supplemented by private counsel who are selected to
prosecute cases on behalf of the Crown,40 6 perhaps a throwback to the
British system of private prosecution.
In France, prosecutors are actually judicial officials. The procurer
and the juge dinstruction4°7 supervise investigations and prosecute
402. See id. at 22-24 (noting that election of prosecutors was an outgrowth of the move-
ment to elect judges, since prosecutors were initially seen as judicial, not executive,
officers).
403. Id. at xvii.
404. Canada enacted its first criminal code in 1892. Under Canadian law, the federal
Parliament enacts a uniform national criminal code, which is administered by both
federal and provincial law enforcement officers. Anthony N. Doob, New Role for Par-
liament in Canadian Sentencing, 9 FED. SENT. R. 239, 239-40 (1997).
405. Federal prosecutors also bring criminal prosecutors for violations of the Criminal
Code in the three territories, through a group of lawyers known as the "Northern
Flying Squad." See DEP'T OF JUSTICE OF CAN., THE FEDERAL PROSECUTION SERVICE
DESKBOOK %§ 2.1-2.4 (2005), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/fps-sfp/
fpd/ch02.html; Id. % 5.1-5.6, http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/fps-sfp/
fpd/ch05.html; Public Prosecution Service of Canada, About the Public Prosecution
Service of Canada, http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/bas/abt-suj.html (last visited Jan.
30, 2009) [hereinafter About the PPSC].
406. See About the PPSC, supra note 405; Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Agent
Affairs, http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/aaf-man/index.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2009) [hereinafter Agent Affairs].
407. See JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAw 128 (1998) (describing
L'instruction, the judicial process used to determine whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to justify bringing a suspect to trial).
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crimes, although ninety-five percent of French cases are handled by the
procurer or magistrate.°8 With a relatively small number of judicial offi-
cials available to act in this role, the police play a more significant role in
the investigatory stages of the prosecution than in common law coun-
tries. 40 9 As is typical of civil law countries, prosecutions may also be
initiated by a private party, who can also participate in the criminal
process before and during trial.410
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE IN AMERICAN LAW
Comparative law analysis can inform our understanding of Ameri-
can law, but a solution to an American social and legal problem must
also reflect the unique reality of American institutions and sensibilities.
In the context of the "fetal protection" wars, this reality includes an ex-
pensive, dysfunctional, and often inequitable healthcare system, a highly
decentralized system of criminal prosecution with more than three thou-
sand separate federal and state prosecutors' offices, and a society whose
racial and ethnic composition and cultural mores are changing rapidly.
To put an end to the "fetal protection" wars, and to achieve the goal
of getting more women necessary healthcare access, including drug
treatment, so that their children can have the best chances for a life of
health and success, the following four steps are both crucial and feasible:
1) declaring a national moratorium on prosecutions of women for fetal
abuse; 2) expanding access to healthcare for women, especially pregnant
women; 3) improving and expanding substance abuse treatment pro-
grams; and 4) expanding the economic supports necessary for pregnant
women and new parents.
A. End Criminal Prosecutions
The most important step is to end the criminal prosecutions of
pregnant women based on their behavior and decisions while pregnant.
Using the resources and connections of the National Association of At-
torneys General, and the National District Attorneys Association, as well
as advocacy groups, like the ACLU Reproductive Rights Project and
408. Conversation with Jacqueline Ross, Professor, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, at Compara-
tive Law Workshop at the University of Michigan Law School, May 15, 2008.
409. See BELL ET AL., supra note 407, at 125-26. These are the judicial police, authorized
by article 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. C. PR. P9N. art. 14.
410. BELL ET AL., supra note 407, at 130, 134-35; Lettow Lerner, supra note 309, at 819-
22.
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National Advocates for Pregnant Women, and medical and public
health authorities, all federal, state, and local prosecutors should be
urged to agree to stop criminally prosecuting pregnant women. With
the exception of South Carolina, the highest court in every state pre-
sented with a "fetal protection" prosecution has declared it unlawful.
The only conceivable point in initiating such a criminal proceeding is
for a prosecutor to pursue political ambitions and/or to push the state
legislature to action. 1' Yet the data are clear that such prosecutions do
not deter pregnant women from abusing substances, either illegal or le-
gal, because the nature of addiction is such that a drug user cannot
readily stop her drug use.4 12 There is no data showing that the use of
criminal sanctions in addition to the ones already available for the un-
derlying crime of drug use or possession have any salutary effect on the
addict's behavior or a general deterrence effect. Instead, available data
suggest that such sanctions simply make women more fearful of reveal-
ing the problem of their addiction, and therefore less likely to receive
the help they need.413
B. Reform the American Healthcare System
The healthcare system must be reformed to guarantee healthcare
across their lives to all Americans, with pregnant women and women of
child-bearing age given priority in this reform effort. Medicaid already
pays for one third of all American births; how much better it would be
to spend government money preventatively. Young girls, teenagers, and
women of reproductive age are much less likely to become pregnant in
situations where this is not advisable or desired if they (and their male
counterparts) have routine access to age-appropriate healthcare. This
must include reproductive healthcare to prevent infertility, the transmis-
sion of sexually transmitted diseases, and other reproductive health
problems, as well as the prevention of unwanted pregnancy, through the
provision of birth control and abortion where necessary. Women who
are in good general health and who are able to control their reproductive
lives are much less likely to become pregnant unintentionally or to con-
411. See, for example, the comments made by the Wyoming prosecutor in the Michelle
Foust case, supra note 98.
412. See generally NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE POPULATIONS 1 (2006), available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/
PDF/PODAT_CJ/PODATCJ.pdf.
413. This is the position taken by the Supreme Court in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67 (2001), as well as by a broad coalition of medical and public health
groups. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 100-102.
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tinue a pregnancy when other aspects of their lives, ranging from being
in school to being addicted to drugs, make having a baby unwise.
C Provide Effective, Non-Stigmatizing Drug Treatment
A major part of this healthcare reform must include the creation of
radically improved drug treatment programs. Current resources for the
treatment of women who abuse alcohol and other drugs are completely
inadequate, for three reasons. Most substance abuse programs fail to
recognize the significant relationship between domestic violence and
women's mental illness and substance abuse,414 fail to acknowledge the
differing treatment needs of men and women, and do not provide a
supplementary support system which is necessary for pregnant women
to beat their addiction. Only fourteen percent of the drug treatment
facilities in the United States have program specifically designed to treat
pregnant and postpartum women."'
Many women who abuse drugs were sexually abused or beaten as
children and have significant mental health and self-esteem issues, which
make it much more likely that they will misuse drugs.416 Women will
not receive the support necessary to recover from addiction and mental
illness unless drug treatment programs and those who work with the
victims of domestic violence acknowledge the causal connections be-
tween domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental illness, and
actively intervene to prevent a continuation of current domestic vio-
lence. 17 Those who encounter domestic violence victims, including
police, hospital staff, and social workers, need to be trained about the
broader context of domestic violence, in order for their interventions to
be appropriate and effective.418
Many drug treatment programs are not designed with the needs of
women in mind, nor have they kept abreast of the latest in addiction
research. For example, traditional confrontational approaches, effective
with male drug addicts, do not work well with women, and women also
414. Only thirty-five percent of drug treatment facilities in the United States have pro-
grams specifically designed for women or for persons needing treatment for both
substance abuse and mental illness. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT
SERVICES (N-SSATS): 2003: DATA ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FACILITIES 4
(2004), available at http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/03nssats/nssats-rpt_.03.pdf.
415. Id.
416. Paltrow, supra note 6, at 477; WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 6, at 23.
417. Paltrow, supra note 6, at 477.
418. WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 6, at 21.
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have better treatment outcomes in programs that are for women only.419
For women who are long-term abusers, residential programs are most
effective, but these programs must take into account the needs of1"/ 420
women with children. Childcare, housing, healthcare, job training,
and other supports are all vital if women are to stay clean and become
self-sufficient. In addition, new research suggests that new medica-
tions which focus on the biochemical basis of addiction may assist
people in treatment who cannot afford, in the short term, to be in a
residential program.4' Finally, more programs must emphasize preven-
tion, treating addicted women before they become pregnant.
D. Provide Paid Maternity and Parenting Leaves and Other Social Supports
If the United States truly wants to ensure that children are born
healthy and are able to get a good start in life, state and federal govern-
ments should end their hands-off approach to maternity and parenting
leaves. 2 ' The government, not private employers, should shoulder the
burden of providing economic support to pregnant women and their
partners that will permit them to take a leave from work to prepare for
the birth of a child and make it possible for them to choose to stay at
home with a child for some time after the child is born. The generous
benefits available in France, and the moderate benefits offered in Can-
ada, provide some examples to consider. In addition, social support
programs should be expanded to provide additional support for children
who are at high risk for poor healthcare outcomes or domestic abuse or
neglect, including abuse connected with their mothers' drug addiction.
These include programs like the Nurse-Family Partnership, which has
been shown in trials around the country to be successful in enhancing
children's health status, improving family planning, increasing rates of
maternal employment, decreasing families' reliance on welfare programs,
and generally having the biggest "bang for the buck. 24 New York City
419. SANDRA L. BLOOM, THE PVS DISASTER: POVERTY, VIOLENCE, AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE
IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 123-24 (2002), available at
http://www.sanctuaryweb.com/Documents/PVS%20Final.pdf; WOMEN'S LAw PRO-
JECT, supra note 6, at 29.
420. BLOOM, supra, note 419, at 126-27.
421. See id. at 124 (citing NAT'L INST. OF DRUG ADDICTION, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
PUBL'N No. 13652, TREATMENT METHODS FOR WOMEN (1999)).
422. See Interlandi, supra note 101, at 37-42.
423. See the discussion of the Family and Medical Leave Act, supra Part III.B.
424. JULIA B. ISAACS, BROOKINGS INST., COST-EFFECTIVE INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN 13-
16 (2007); David L. Olds et al., Effects of Nurse Home-Visiting on Maternal Life
Course and Child Development: Age 6 Follow-Up Results of a Randomized Trial, 114
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has launched one such partnership program, connecting visiting nurses
with newly pregnant women who live in poor neighborhoods. 2 ' The
nurses will visit the women throughout pregnancy and for two years
after their infants' births, to assist with breastfeeding, evaluate the in-
fants' health and the safety of the home environment, provide advice
about child development, and make referrals for other necessary social
and health services.4 2 6 While realistically, in a difficult economic climate
and an unabashedly capitalist society, these reforms may need to be im-
plemented incrementally, it is time that we acknowledged the need for
societal support of all our nation's children.
CONCLUSION
It is time to move beyond the rhetoric of "fetal protection," and to
work in practical, non-spectacular ways to help woman escape from ad-
diction, domestic violence, and despair. Only then can the United States
truly take its place among developed nations in promoting the birth of
healthy children. t
PEDIATRICS 1550, 1553-58 (2004); see also LYNN A. KAROLY ET AL., RAND CORP.,
EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTIONS XXVii--XXViii (2005).
425. New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Nurse-Family Partner-
ship, http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/ms/ms-nfp.shtml (last visited Jan. 31,
2009); see also Dorian Block, Mothering Young Moms; City Expands Bronx Program
That Gives One-on-one Support to First-time Parents, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Sept. 30,
2007, at 37, available at 2007 WLNR 19155972; Jean Hopfensperger, Nurse-Family
Partnership: Help Moms Now To Avoid Problems Later; The Visiting Nurse Program for
First-time Mothers Unfolding in Minnesota, has Caught Barack Obama s Notice, STAR
TRiB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 14, 2009, available at http://www.startribune.com/
lifestyle/health/37543234.html (describing the national Nurse-Family Partnerhsip
program).
426. Block, supra note 425; Hopfensperger, supra note 425.
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APPENDIX A
The following cases, in which a woman was prosecuted for her sub-
stance abuse while pregnant, are those for which either a published
decision, other court document, or newspaper article is available.
Arizona
State v. Reinesto, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
California
Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977).
Jaurigue v. People, No. 18988 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 1992).
People v. Stewart, No. M508197, transcript of hearing (Cal.
Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987).
Florida
State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1997).
Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. App. 1991).
State v. Carter, No. 89-6274 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1990),
aff'd, 602 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. App. 1992).
Georgia
Hillman v. State, 503 S.E. 2d 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
Hawaii
State v. Aiwohi, 123 P. 3d 1210 (Haw. 2005).
Illinois
People v. Bedenkop, 625 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
Indiana
Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
State v. Barnett, No. 02D04-9308-CF-6 11, order (Ind. Super.
Ct. Feb. 11, 1994).
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Kentucky
Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W2d 280 (Ky. 1993).
Commonwealth v. Cochran, No. 2006-CA-001561-MR, 2008
Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2008), review
granted, No. 2008-SC-0095-D, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 165
(Aug. 13, 2008).
Maryland
Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. Ct. App. 2006).
Massachusetts
Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
15, 1990), rev'd, 608 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1993).
Michigan
People v. Hardy, 469 N.W2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.), leave to ap-
peal denied, 471 N.W2d 619 (Mich. 1991).
People v. Bremer, No. 90-32227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31,
1991), appeal dismissed, No. 137619 (Mich. Ct. App. July
14, 1992).
People v. Cox, No. 90-53454-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9,
1990), aff'd, No. 131999 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 28,
1992).
Missouri
Brief of Amici Curiae, State v. Lewis, No. 03CR1 13048 (Mo. Cir.
Ct., Chariton County) (on file with author); see also NAT'L
ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, ANNUAL REPORT 5
(2004), available at http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/
file/NAPWAnnualReport2004.pdf.
Nebraska
State v. Arandus, No. 93072 (Neb. Dist. Ct. June 17, 1993).
Nevada
Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596 (Nev.
1994).
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New Jersey
New Jersey v. Barker, No. 96-02-605 (N.J. Super. Ct. Feb. 14,
1997).
New York
People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Geneva City Ct. 1992),
aff'd, slip op. (Ont. County Ct. Sept. 24, 1992).
North Carolina
State v. Inzar, Nos. 90CRS6960, 90CRS6961 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Apr. 9, 1991), appeal dismissed, No. 9116SC778
(N.C. App. Aug. 30, 1991).
Ohio
State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
State v. Andrews, No. JU 68459 (Ohio C.P. June 19, 1989).
Oklahoma
State v. Alexander, No. CF-92-2047, transcript of decision
(Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 1992).
Pennsylvania
Commonwealth v. Kemp, 75 WESTMORELAND L.J. 5 (Pa. Ct.
Com. P1. Dec. 16, 1992), aff'd, No. 114-Pitt-1993 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 1994).
South Dakota
State v. Eagle Hawk, 411 N.W2d 120, 125-26 (S.D. 1987)
(reviewing a conviction for felony child abuse and finding
harmless error in trial court's admission of evidence con-
cerning mother's drug overdose while pregnant).
Texas
Wardv. State, 188 S.W3d 874 (Tex App. 2006).
Collins v. State, 890 S.W2d 893 (Tex. App. 1994).
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Virginia
Commonwealth v. Smith, No. CR-91-05-4381 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 16, 1991).
Commonwealth v. Turner, No. 91-054382 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept.
16, 1991).
Commonwealth v. Wilcox, No. A-44116-01 (Va. Dist. Ct. Oct.
9, 1991).
Washington
State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
Wisconsin
State v. DeborahjZ, 596 N.W2d 490 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
Wyoming
Foust case, see Associated Press, Judge Drops Meth Baby'
Charge, CASPER STAR-TRIB. (Wyo.), Sept. 27, 2005, avail-
able at http://www.trib.com/articles/2005/09/27/news/
wyoming/76df395b95d0af24872570880075b959.txt.
South Carolina
South Carolina is the only state in which convictions of pregnant drug
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